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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER RIGHTS
The identification of the consumer as a discrete party, entitled to specific
legal rights, is a product of the latter half of the twentieth century. Looking
back on the last four decades, one can now clearly detect a trend for special
legislation protecting the interests of consumers. These resonate with the values
expounded by President Kennedy, who famously in his 15 March 1962
declaration to the United States Congress said: "Consumers by definition,
include us all ... They are the largest economic group, affecting and affected by
almost every public and private economic decision. Yet they are the only
important group ... whose views are often not heard." He declared four basic
consumer rights: the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to
choose, and the right to be heard. Significantly for our present theme, the right
to redress was not mentioned, but as we shall see this has become an important
aspect of consumer law and policy and is one of four additional rights
developed by Consumers International.' States in developed economies were
relatively quick to start granting rights based on Kennedy's declaration to their
consumers, and most now have fairly comprehensive consumer laws.
Developing countries continue to catch up under the influence of the United
Nations Guidelines on Consumer Protection.2
However, in recent times the legislatures of the First World have become
more reluctant to regulate consumer issues. In part, this may be a form of
paralysis, because the consumer problems of today are no longer of the
manageable order that yesterday's politicians were able to gain plaudits for
addressing in a way that produced obvious improvements. Also, whether it was
the impact of consumer laws, competitive forces, developments in technology,
or other factors, one can certainly say that the quality of cars, white goods, and
to some extent the practices of creditors, have improved over the last few
decades. A more daunting set of tasks face today's politicians if they wish to
claim to be able to use law to control the types of risks3 facing the modem
consumer -witness the issues concerning BSE, GM foods, and the threat to state
regulation posed by trading on the internet.
1. The others are the rights to satisfaction of basic needs, to education, and to a healthy
environment.
2. GA. Res. 39, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 106th mtg., U.N. Doc. (1985); See Guidelines for
Consumer Protection, Department of International Economic Affairs, U.N., N.Y. (1986).
3. See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY, (1992).
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Even in the traditional arena for consumer law, i.e. the sale of consumer
durables, governments are less keen to regulate. This is partly because, on the
whole most developed countries have fairly strong consumer laws, and there is
a preference for self-regulatory solutions to new problems. This reflects the
feeling that there is little sense in adopting laws if they do not actually lead to
traders changing their behavior and wronged consumers being able to have
access to justice. There is certainly an appreciation that rather than piling up
consumer laws, it is important to make those we already have work better.
Of course one way of enforcing consumer laws is through public
enforcement. This is especially appropriate with respect to safety issues, where
the supervision of the marketplace cannot safely be left to individual initiative.
Equally, financial services are so vital for individuals and often involve sums
so large that the state clearly has a role in supervising the market. At the other
end of the spectrum, state involvement might be desirable to deal with small
economic losses which might not justify individual litigation, and also for
matters of taste where the state might feel it should be involved and individuals
may again not be sufficiently motivated to act themselves. The function of the
state as protector of the consumer is, however, another inquiry, for we are
concerned in this essay with how consumers as individuals can invoke the law
to voice their concerns, obtain redress, and help ensure the development of
higher trading standards. Our discussion of public authorities will therefore be
limited to their role in assisting consumers to utilize the law. This essay is
concerned with assessing the comparative efficacy of different modes of
consumer redress within disparate regulatory cultures.
II. WAVES OF ACCESS To JUSTICE
A good starting point for the legal analysis of consumer access to justice
issues must still be the seminal work of Prof. Mauro Capelletti.4 This influential
work has proven to be fertile ground for many subsequent commentators, but
we believe there is still merit in reconsidering his theories in the present political
and regulatory climate. This is not least because we shall go on to show that,
in addition to the three waves in the access to justice movement which Capelletti
discerned, two subsequent regulatory and globalization waves can be detected,
and we will argue for an extension of his analysis in the form of a further
integrative wave. Capelletti's first wave concerned economic matters (i.e.
providing citizens with the legal means to seek justice, i.e. legal aid). The
second wave was organizational (i.e. extending standing to bodies that could act
4. See generally MAURO CAPELLETTI & B. GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1976); MAURO
CAPELLETTI, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE, (1981); See also Mauro Capelletti, Alternative
Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the Worldwide Access to Justice Movement, 56 MOD.
L. REV. 282 (1993).
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on behalf of diffuse interests and developing class actions). The third wave was
procedural (i.e. developing ADR). It is interesting to reflect on these three
waves with the benefit of hindsight.
Reading the literature of the late seventies and early eighties on how to
make legal services available to the public,5 one is struck by the optimistic tone
struck by legal radicals. At that time the UK, for instance, had a relatively large
legal aid budget and a flourishing Law Centre movement. With hindsight this
optimism was misplaced. Today in the UK, it would be unrealistic to suggest
that the public purse should finance increased lawyers to fight for the
vulnerable. Although there is the possibility of some legal provision being
given to consumers through the Community Legal Service6 and grants to bodies
like the Citizen's Advice Bureaux do continue, nevertheless the move is to
restrict legal aid and to privatize the delivery of legal services through the use
of contingent fees. A similar pattern is replicated in other countries.
However, the second and third waves remain strong. The organizational
changes have indeed strengthened the role of bodies such as consumer
organizations and public authorities in representing the consumer collective
interest. This can be rationalized as reflecting the law's recognition that
litigation has increased in significance as a means of protecting consumers as
compared to direct regulation. A very practical manifestation of this is the EC's
Consumer Injunctions Directive.' Moreover, class action procedures have
spread throughout the common law world and are being discussed in many civil
law countries, and even introduced in a few.8 In some rare instances in common
law countries, public bodies are even allowed to support individual litigation.9
In civil law countries with the partie civile procedure, the prosecutors assist
consumers to compensation by bringing criminal actions which can lead to
compensation.
The procedural wave favoring ADR has of course continued apace. There
has always been a certain ambiguity as to the motives for adopting ADR. Some
view it as a sensible and affordable way of dealing with relatively minor
consumer problems. Others champion it as a means to provide a higher form
of justice than that which is served up by the adversarial court process.'" For
5. See e.g., M. Zander, The First Wave, in ACCESSTOJUSTICEANDTHE WELFARE STATE(1981).
6. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22 (Eng.); See at http://www.justask.org.uk (last visited Aug. 29,
2002).
7. Council Directive 98/27, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
8. Such as Quebec, and to some extent, France.
9. For instance, this is possible for product liability actions in Australia, see the Australian
Consumer and Competition Commission - role and functions, at
http://www.accc.gov.au/pubs/Publications/Corporate/ACCCRoleFuncti.pdf (last visited October 12, 2002).
10. CAPELLETTI, supra note 4, (referring to it as "co-existential justice").
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others it is seen as merely providing second class justice for the poor." Some
recent moves, such as the introduction of compulsory arbitration for small
claims in Germany, are clearly primarily motivated by a desire for cost
reduction.'" Indeed one can detect a certain managerial edge to the
administration of many ADR schemes, yet instances can still be discovered
where ADR is advocated as a better form of justice more suited to the needs of
consumers.
Thus some of the same issues continue to be the same as when Capelletti
defined his three waves, albeit that the contours of debate have evolved over
time. If one were seeking to identify new waves, one might select the
regulatory function of redress actions and cross-border or globalization
dimension.
Litigation has always had a regulatory function. The nineteenth century
German scholar Rudolf von Ihering found it unsatisfactory that individuals
should decide whether to institute litigation on the basis of a personal cost-
benefit analysis, because they had a duty to take into account the public interest
in demonstrating the effectiveness of the law and deterring potential law
breakers.' 3 The changes in organizational structure have helped emphasize the
role litigation plays in developing standards. The motivation behind injunctions
brought by state agencies and/or consumer organizations is primarily to promote
better trading practices. Class actions often have, as one dimension, the desire
to ensure that wrongs are exposed and that remedial action is taken. This
learning process 4 function of litigation has also become evident in some ADR
schemes. For instance, an important function of private sector Ombudsmen
schemes is to provide guidance to industry through published decisions or
annual reports. Even arbitration Schemes are aware that they have to provide
some means of commenting on the poor practices they come across. It is
perhaps only in the small claims courts, where the cases are too minor to be
reported and there is no supervisory structure, that the need to learn the lessons
of disputes is not being appreciated.
The globalization of consumer disputes is becoming more than a mere
theoretical problem. This is a factor of increased international travel and trade. 5
It is most prominent in the EC, which as the world's most integrated free trade
zone, has encouraged consumers to shop across borders and has taken
11. RICHARD ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, (1992).
12. See § 15a EGZPO (Gesetz betreffend die Einfifhrung der Zivilprozebordnung).
13. Dr. Rudolf von Ihering, Der Kampf Um's Recht, (1889) quoted in H. Ktz, PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY in Capelletti (1981) op cit.
14. K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, The Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method,
49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1940).
15. The events of September 11 th may lead to some reduction in travel in the short term at least, but
trade will remain increasingly international.
2002]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
responsibility for making it easier for consumers to obtain redress, should things
go wrong. 6 However, this is now a global phenomenon, given the increasing
pervasiveness of Internet trading. This causes problems for regulatory
authorities' 7 and also individuals who want to seek redress from overseas. The
Internet challenges conventional rules on how law should control businesses.
Even if one wanted to hold on to the belief that the traditional court based forms
of redress were adequate to deal with consumer problems, this cannot be a
realistic response to the Internet. Formal court procedures cannot be the right
way to resolve disputes for small amounts between parties on the opposite side
of the globe. The only practical solution is some sort of virtual ADR court.
This forces one to confront the economics of litigation, but in fact it only
confirms and reinforces the existing trend.
We shall conclude with a request for a sixth integrative wave to be
generated in the future, which involves bringing the ordinary courts and the
ADR schemes into sync. We see a strange phenomenon occurring. The
collective dimension is being recognized in the court system (collective
injunctions and class actions), yet the focus of consumer litigation is being
shifted to ADR mechanisms in which these collective instruments rarely exist.
Equally, some ADR mechanisms are taking their function of raising trade
standards extremely seriously and are adopting innovative techniques, yet the
traditional courts continue to rely upon publicity of decisions, which is not
really meaningful for small consumer claims. Thus, we want there to be a sixth
wave of integration of innovations between the courts and ADR institutions.
1I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A COMPARATIVE VENTURE
There are many examples of good practice in the consumer redress field.
However, we will caution that, whilst one should accept that consumer redress
mechanisms will be - and indeed we will argue ought to be - different from
ordinary court procedures, one should not accept that these differences ought to
be an excuse for simply providing a poorer version of what already exists.
Consumer problems need unique solutions. Our intention is not to map out a
common model for consumer redress institutions which each country should
follow. The exact mix (for inevitably there will be a mix) of redress systems
will vary from country to country, depending upon national traditions and legal
cultures, and will inevitably build upon what already exists. However, we
believe a comparative survey will provide some interesting models and reveal
some important lessons. We also hope that we can provide some guiding
principles of universal value against which national systems can be judged. The
16. See infra pp. 51-53.
17. Allan Fels, The Global Enforcement Challenge: Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws
in a Global Marketplace, (Aug. 1997) (discussion paper).
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most fundamental being that one should welcome the uniqueness of redress
schemes set up to address consumer problems, and not simply judge them by
how closely they replicate the ordinary courts. In fact, we suggest that the
potential of new alternatives may not be fully delivered, and problems can
result, if they are simply modeled and judged against existing court based
redress schemes.
It is with regard to redress schemes dealing with relatively small individual
disputes that most work has been undertaken to develop criteria against which
they should be judged. We shall review this, but we also seek to paint a broader
canvas of consumers' use of litigation. It is harder to put forward universal
principles to cover all types of consumer litigation. For instance, different
criteria will apply depending on whether the claim is a one-off individual
dispute or raises broader collective consumer concerns; equally the ability of the
consumer to obtain legal representation will be relevant in some but not all
types of dispute.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMER DISPUTES
At a fundamental level, it is possible to suggest certain special
characteristics of consumer litigation which explain why we think it calls for an
entirely different and novel approach, rather than simply a slimmed down
version of traditional models of justice. Consumers often have small claims,
although the total harm caused by a particular problem to the consumer
collective can be great. Even small claims can have a significant impact on
consumer welfare. This is especially so for the disadvantaged, who ironically
are less likely to seek redress. Moreover, consumer problems are likely to be
a greater irritant to consumer lives than their mere economic consequences
might suggest, because of the distress and wasted time the problems generate.
What to lawyers looks like an economic problem, often translates to the
consumer as a social problem.
Consumers come in all shapes and sizes and few will have the resources
to employ lawyers to deal with their consumer problems, and many will be
intimidated by approaching traders or third party dispute resolution procedures.
One only has to look at the low levels of literacy even in developed western
societies to see how the prospect of writing a formal complaint, yet alone being
enmeshed in legal proceedings, might be a forbidding prospect for many.
Others will simply not find it worthwhile to expend energy on relatively small
claims.
Thus, consumer claims often represent individual losses, but need
collective procedures often involving third parties representing them, to find a
remedy. Advocating such procedures can be quite a tricky argument to win.
The need for such mechanisms is obvious in contexts like the environment,
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where there can be no obvious human victim. In contrast, in the consumer
context, the jibe can be made that if the victim does not think the claim merits
action, then there is no real 'mischief' to be remedied. However, it is hoped that
the reader can see that whilst it may be a sensible decision for individuals not
to take such cases, this may mask real consumer detriment. It has been
suggested that many individuals who bring cases have to possess "super-spite" 8
to do so. Nevertheless, society would benefit from wrongs being rectified and
trading standards being improved and this requires some mechanisms for
consumer grievances to be voiced.
Consumer disputes can be categorized into four categories. Variables
might include whether the claim is specific to an individual or if it affects the
consumer collective, and whether it is for a large or small amount.' 9 Where
claims involve large individual claims, the consumer aspect of the claim is
perhaps less significant. Such claims raise the same familiar issues, such as
funding and the courts' ability to influence behavior, that are pervasive
throughout the law.20 For this reason we will not spend more time on the
problems facing consumers with large claims where they are of an individual
nature. We will dwell longer on the issues surrounding large claims, which
represent a collective problem. This is both because they raise specific concerns
of organization and funding and also because we wish to reflect on the ability
of such actions to promote the collective interest. The law in this area is making
some hesitant steps at improvement. This allows us to contrast the position with
how poorly the law facilitates collective claims where the amounts at stake are
small for individuals, even if collectively they are large. However, our focus
will first be on the main practical problem which consumers pose for the legal
system. Namely, how to manage the numerous small individual disputes
consumers have.
V. INDIVIDUAL SMALL CLAIMS
Two main approaches have been adopted to manage disparate consumer
disputes often involving small amounts. Under one approach, the dispute is
characterized according to the type of consumer product or service involved,
and a separate dispute mechanism provided which appropriately matches the
dispute characteristics in some sense. This approach has been followed in a
number of the countries which we studied, where particular grievance remedial
processes are provided for disputes in connection with specific and discrete
18. Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite- The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE
L.J. 1,21 (1970).
19. Leaving to one side the debate is about what is a small claim.
20. It should be noted however, that some of the Ombudsmen schemes for instance, can award quite
considerable sums, although most operate a ceiling on the awards that are binding on firms.
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products. So we see for example, an arbitration scheme set up to deal with
complaints about vehicles,2 a complaints board to deal with insurance
disputes, 22 and ombudsmen to deal with specific sector disputes.23 Commonly,
this is a privatized form of justice. This approach carries the advantage that
most such schemes abide by standards of fairness,24 and provide a decision
maker who has expertise and specialist knowledge. However, since in many
instances the imperative for the setting up of such mechanisms (and indeed the
finance) has come from the product or service providers, there may be a trade-
off between this managerialist approach and the kind of guarantees of
independence and impartiality which are taken for granted in the traditional
adjudicative setting.
The other approach is to provide a special state-funded mechanism, and to
invest it with the particular characteristics, which are regarded as suitable for
'small' consumer disputes of any nature. Most commonly, this mechanism will
be a variant or adaptation of the normal court hearing (although the state-funded
Scandinavian Consumer Complaints Boards are an exception providing an
informal mode of resolution). Here, the advantages of specialism may not
pertain (although there are some exceptions, notably the Consumer Credit
Tribunals in some Australian jurisdictions and the specialist boards that work
within the Scandinavia Consumer Complaints Board structure) and while the
independence of the adjudicator is unlikely to be put in question, other concerns
may arise as to the suitability of the forum given many of their origins in court-
based formal proceedings.
The advantages of court based schemes are that they have the authority of
law, are independent, and can hand down binding decisions. These are also the
roots of some of the disadvantages of using courts as a means of consumer
protection. Judicial processes have to maintain a degree of formalism that can
be off-putting to consumers. The judges may have limited knowledge of
consumer law and even less appreciation that consumer problems may call for
solutions which stretch traditional legal concepts. Also, each court decision is
21. G. Howells & R. James, Litigation in the Consumer Interest, Report for the Nuffield Foundation
and paper presentation to the Annual Conference of the Society of Pubic Teachers of Law, (Sept. 1999)
(discussing the Canadian Motor Vehicle Arbitration Plan (CAMVAP)).
22. Id. (discussing Norwegian Bureau for Insurance Disputes Forsikringsklagekontoret
Arsbereming).
23. Id. (discussing the example of the banking ombudsmen in Australia, Canada, the UK, and New
Zealand); See RHODA JAMES, PRIVATE OMBUDSMEN AND PUBLIC LAW, (1997) (for a discussion on the banking
ombudsmen in Australia, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand, and for other private ombudsmen in the UK);
R. James & P. Morris, The New Financial Ombudsmen Service in the UK- Has the Second Generation Got
it Right?, Paper presented to the 8th International Consumer Law Conference in New Zealand (Apr. 9-1I,
2001).
24. In most instances, they also provide for awards which are binding, or binding de facto, on the
business.
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seen as unique, and there is normally no attempt to obtain an overview of
consumer issues in order to tackle systemic problems. Of course some legal
systems have done their best to eliminate these problems. New Zealand, is one
such example, where the disputes tribunals are quite distinct from traditional
courts.2 5
One point requires emphasis, since it must colour any conclusions about
how well individual redress mechanisms work. Whatever form they take, small
claims court or ADR system, consumer redress mechanisms are still unlikely to
serve the interests of the most disadvantaged. As one commentator in the
United Kingdom has said after studying the small claims courts there "for the
most part, small claims hearings involve well-to-do people suing other well-to-
do people., 26 This mirrors research findings from the US and Canada.27 ADR
procedures have a similar record.28 However accessible and effective they may,
they are still operating in a context where the balance is skewed against those
who can least bear the loss caused by a faulty product or service, and who may
be least able to negotiate successfully with a company.
In setting out to examine mechanisms for individual consumer redress it
is immediately clear that here is an area where Capelletti's third procedural
wave is particularly evident, in form at least. But the whole range of consumer
redress problems are not usually covered by such procedures, and one should
note a broad distinction between disputes concerning the financial services
sector, where ADR schemes are quite numerous, and general consumer disputes
about goods and services where there continues to be a need to rely on court
based solutions, albeit that court procedures have often been modified to
accommodate small claims.
Different forms of ADR have been taken up in different countries. In
some, notably Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, the private
ombudsman has proved to be a popular consumer remedy with business,
government, and broadly with consumer interests. There is evidence of its
success in providing an easy-to-use and free process for the individual
25. See discussion in Geraint Howells, Rhoda James & Peter Spiller, Making the Alternative
Appropriate: ADRfor Consumer, 7 N.Z. BUS. L. Q. 204 (2001).
26. J. BALDWIN, SMALL CLAIMS IN THE COUNTY COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE BARGAIN
BASEMENT OF CIVIL JUSTICE, (1997).
27. JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETNOGRAPHY OF
LEGAL DISCLOSURE, (1990); Seana C. McGuire & Roderick A. MacDonald, Small Claims Court Cant, 34
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 3,509 (1996).
28. John Birds & Cosmo Graham, Complaints Against Insurance Companies, I CONSUMER L.J. 92
(1993) (explaining that private ombudsmen have been found to be accessed largely by male, middle class
professionals); Rhoda James & Mary Seneviratne, Offering Views in Both Directions: A Survey of Member
Agencies and Complainants on Their Views of the Ombudsman for Corporate Estate Agents Schemes,
Sheffield Law Faculty (1996).
[Vol. 9:1
Howells & James
consumer.29 (Typically, they are able to decide disputes taking into account the
relevant law, industry codes of practice, and considerations of what is fair and
reasonable and make awards of up to a financial limit, which in the UK is
£100,000, which are binding on the companies in the scheme.)
Despite its popularity as a consumer grievance mechanism in many
countries, the spread of this type of private ombudsman has not been universal.
In the US, which is notable for the rapid proliferation of ombudspersons, the
office has been largely confined to the governmental or public agency sphere,
with some limited individual corporate instances.3° The idea of an ombudsman
to cover a particular industry or corporate sector has not taken hold as it has in
other countries. Whether this results from a different regulatory climate or the
availability of other, preferred consumer remedies is unclear, but it provides
emphasis for the point that it would be impractical to prescribe universal
solutions.
Where the idea has taken hold, it has to be said that private ombudsmen are
largely concentrated in financial services. The structural features of industries
in those sectors have meant that the early provision of an external complaints
mechanism was a feasible voluntary response to threats of statutory
intervention. The absence of ombudsmen in the retail sector is striking and
may, incidentally, go some way to explaining research findings in the UK that
ombudsmen played a minimal role in consumer disputes.3'
In most countries there are. some consumer sectors, outside financial
services, which operate codes of practice including the provision of a low cost
arbitration schemes. One problem with these schemes is their often low
visibility to the public eye, and also their perceived lack of independence.
Consumers are concerned not so much about the independence of the arbitrator,
but rather about attempts to force them to mediate claims. Moves are afoot to
improve these schemes,32 but as a general rule, it is true to say that globally
outside the financial service sector, there are few examples of effective industry
ADR schemes.
29. The spread continues. See, Government to Appoint Banking Ombudsman, DAWN (London), June
19, 2001, at I (discussing Pakistan's Finance Minister's announcement of his intention to appoint a banking
ombudsman).
30. See Donald C. Rowat, The Parliamentary Ombudsman: Should the Scandinavian Scheme Be
Transplanted?, 28 INT'L REV. ADMIN. SC. 399 (1962); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN:
GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, (1966); Larry B. Hill, Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and
Bureaucracy, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1075, 1077 (1974); Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just and Lasting Peace:
Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 95 (1996); See also
Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombudsman Offices, 2000, A.B.A. Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
31. HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW, (1999).
32. See Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee of the
American Arbitration Association: Consumer Due Process Protocol, (May 1998).
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The kind of criteria against which to judge mechanisms for individual
consumer redress are well known, and there is a general consensus in the
literature33 about the kind of points which need to be met, certainly for a non-
court based resolution scheme. The benchmarks recently adopted by the
Australian Government34 are broadly representative of this consensus
identifying considerations of accessibility, independence, fairness,
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. The European Commission, too,
has been looking at consumer redress and has produced a Recommendation on
the principles applicable to bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of
consumer disputes. 5 These are the principles of independence, transparency, the
adversarial principle, and principles of effectiveness, legality, liberty, and
representation. Both the benchmarks and principles bear detailed examination.
Although they cover much the same ground, there are some interesting
differences that serve to illustrate some of the difficulties faced in trying to
devise an all-purpose model for consumer redress. They also highlight areas of
deficiency. Since, for us, they seem to encompass the kind of considerations
which must be integral to an effective consumer redress mechanism, in this
article we shall use them to test all the consumer redress schemes we have
examined in our comparative survey, whether or not those schemes are court-
based or ADR institutions, and regardless of whether the criteria would be
formally applicable in their national setting.
The Australian benchmarks seem well suited to an ombudsman type of
remedy. The EC principles have inevitably been fashioned to cover the
multiplicity of forms of redress which currently exist within the EU, and one
can detect in places the influence of the court-based, formal approach favored
in civil law countries. Clearly some formal protection is required. The question
is as to where the balance should be struck between, on the one hand, imposing
the kind of formal protections for the consumer which have their origins in a
judicialized forum, and on the other, accepting that for out-of-court procedures
to function as a cheap and accessible remedy then some formal procedural
requirements must be relaxed.
VI. INDEPENDENCE
Independence is probably the most crucial characteristic. It is also one
which is easier to demonstrate the closer the mechanism is to a judicial model.
33. See, e.g., John Birds & Cosmo Graham, Complaints Mechanisms in the Financial Services
Industry, I CIV. JUST. Q 313 (1988).
34. J. Chris Ellison, Minister for Customs and Consumer Affairs, Benchmarks for Industry-Based
Customer Dispute Resolution (1997).
35. Commission Recommendation 98/257 on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible
for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31.
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Both the benchmark and the EC principles require that institutional
arrangements should be in place to guarantee the independence of the decision-
making body and thus the impartiality of the decisions. The benchmark requires
that the members of the scheme (i.e. the companies), should have no role in the
decision making process and the administration of the scheme. Both require
that the arrangements made as to the appointment of the decision maker should
be such as to ensure independence from the companies, and the principle
requires that where a decision is taken by an individual, this independence is to
be guaranteed by a range of measures including the requirement that the
appointment of that individual should be for a period of time sufficient to ensure
independence, and that the individual should not be liable to be relieved of his
duties without just cause
The principle also requires that the person appointed should not have
worked for the professional association or one of its members within three years
of the appointment, if that professional association is concerned in the
appointment or remuneration of the decision maker; but it does not impose any
limits on where a post holder might go after holding such an appointment. This
might, however, be at least as significant an issue.
These are all criteria which are met by small claims courts. As to
arbitration, there is usually no serious question about lack of formal
independence of arbitrators, but concerns arise where they are habitually
appointed by an industry and may give the appearance of, at the least,
familiarity with the company representatives. This is the familiar problem of
the advantages of repeat players.
Lack of independence from the industry which funds the private
ombudsman has been one long standing criticism. However, the criticism
usually relates to the institutional arrangements rather than any suggestion of
lack of impartiality on the part of the individuals who hold the office. That said,
there has been some evidence of individual ombudsmen having to withstand
covert industry pressure.36 The private ombudsman has its origins in the United
Kingdom, and the solution devised there to keep the companies at arms length
from the ombudsman and his decision making was a tri-partite structure which
placed an ombudsman council (chaired by an independent person of high repute
and with a majority of independent members) between the ombudsman and the
company which funded the scheme. This was the model adopted first by the
insurance industry in the United Kingdom when they introduced the first such
ombudsman in 1981, and it is a format that has been largely exported to
Australia, NZ, and Canada. Concerns have still been voiced however about the
36. See Howells & James, supra note 21, for an example of a former Australian Banking
Ombudsman and a former UK Insurance Ombudsman; P.E. Morris & J.A. Hamilton, The Insurance
Ombudsman and the PIA Ombudsman: A Critical Comparison, 47 N. Ir. LEGAL Q. 119 (1996).
2002]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
influence of the industry,37 and there have also been concerns where the
ombudsman company had the final power of approval and reappointment withS 38
the result that some schemes have moved to fixed term appointments. In the
United Kingdom, many of these concerns will only be of historic interest, since
the new Financial Ombudsman Service is about to take over the work of eight
existing ombudsman schemes in the financial services sector. As a statutory
scheme, this now represents a reverse in the privatization trend, looking, as it
does, rather like a nationalization of a previously self-regulatory mechanism.
39
Similar plans have been put forward in Canada to introduce one ombudsman in
the financial services sector.4n
The EC principle of independence further requires that any individual who
is the decision maker must possess the abilities, experience and competence,
'particularly in the field of law', required to carry out this function. Most
arbitrators, ombudsmen and judges in small claims courts are lawyers, although
there are notable exceptions, especially for example, in the New Zealand
Disputes Tribunals where only ten percent are lawyers.4 ' Some ombudsmen, the
current Canadian Banking Ombudsman, for example, and some in the United
Kingdom 42 are drawn from other professional backgrounds. In our view this
does not seem to detract from their effectiveness. Indeed, since these
ombudsmen are generally required to make rulings in the light of what is fair
and reasonable there may well be advantages in a non-lawyer examining
established practices with a fresh eye, free from any preconceptions. But as it
is, most of the existing ombudsmen are lawyers further confirming the view that
37. See Howells & James, supra note 21, at 31, for an example of where Democracy watch have
argued that subsequent appointments to independent directorships of the Canadian Banking Ombudsman Inc.
are inevitably tainted because the original appointees (who made subsequent appointments) were selected by
the industry.
38. Id.
39. James & Morris, supra note 23.
40. See Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector, Change
Challenge Opportunity, (1998) (explaining that the relevant legislation finally received the royal assent in June
2001. More recently, it was announced in December 2001, that the five major financial services industries
in Canada- banks, life and health insurers, property and casualty insurers, investment dealers, and the mutual
fund industry- have agreed to the creation, on a self-regulatory basis, of a National Financial Services
OmbudService (NFSO), which will provide a central contact point for consumers where they can be referred
to. the relevant industry redress mechanisms, some of which are yet to be put in place. It is understood that
the new redress mechanisms are likely to be modeled on the existing Canadian Banking Ombudsman
organization, which will itself form part of NFSO. The NFSO is to come into operation in July 2002, CANADA
NEWS WIRE, Dec. 20, 2001, and an interview by the authors with Mike Lauber, (Jan. 8, 2002).
41. PETER SPILLER, THE DISPUTES TRIBUNALS OF NEW ZEALAND, (1997).
42. See for example, the current and previous Estates Agents Ombudsman, and the Legal Services
Ombudsman. In the case of the latter, the relevant legislation prescribes that the post-holder who oversees
complaints against lawyers may not be a lawyer.
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the alternative dispute resolution "industry" has been colonized by the legal
profession.43
VII. ACCESSIBILITY
Accessibility, especially in terms of cheapness and ease of use are crucial
elements and most ADR systems would claim these as strengths. The
accessibility benchmark also requires that the redress scheme be well
publicized, that there should be appropriate assistance for disadvantaged
complainants and that a complainant should be able to make contact with the
scheme orally, even though the complaint must ultimately be reduced to writing.
For the benchmark, industry-based schemes should be free of charge and legal
representation should be avoided except in exceptional circumstances. It also
suggests that conciliation, mediation and negotiation should be used to attempt
to settle complaints and that a legalistic and adversarial approach be
discouraged. It is here that there is evidence, perhaps of a cultural difference
between the Australian benchmarks and the EC principles, the latter favoring
a more adjudicative model. On the one hand, the EC's principle of effectiveness
requires that the consumer should have access without being obliged to use a
legal representative, that the procedure should either be free or of moderate cost,
that only a short period should elapse between the referral of a matter and the
decision, and that the competent body should have an active role. On the other,
the principle of representation requires that the redress procedure should not
deprive the parties of the right to be represented or assisted by a third party at
any stage of the procedure. The adversarial principle requires that the procedure
followed should allow all the parties concerned to present their viewpoint before
the competent body and to hear the arguments and facts put forward by the other
party, and any experts' statements. But this tilt towards formality is mitigated
to some extent by the preamble to the Recommendation, which states that while
the interests of the parties can only be safeguarded if the procedure allows them
to express their viewpoint before the decision maker and to know the facts and
arguments presented by the other side, this does not necessarily necessitate oral
hearings of the parties.
Nevertheless, there seems to be an underlying tension between the
perception that procedural rights must always be available and the need to
provide an out-of-court remedy which is informal and easy for the consumer to
use. For instance, the benchmark emphasis on conciliation may not lead to
substantive justice for the consumer given the inequalities that exist and which
can be exploited in negotiations.
43. MICHAEL PALMER & SIMON ROBERTS, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS
OF DECISION MAKING, (1998).
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Most ADR systems score well on accessibility. The state-funded
Scandinavian Complaints Boards, for example, are easy to use, comparatively
cheap to invoke, and the large numbers of new complaints received each year
are testimony to their popularity. However, most are slow, taking on average
a year to reach a final decision. This seems to be largely a function of lack of
resources." One of the strengths of private ombudsman schemes, too, has been
their comparative accessibility. Individuals can make a complaint without the
help of a lawyer or other third party and without a charge or fee. That is not to
say that they have achieved as wide a coverage as they might, and those few
studies45 which have gathered socio-economic data on complainants tend to
suggest that complainants are more usually drawn from the middle-classes.
The paper-only procedure adopted by most ombudsmen seems to make it
easy and cheap for certain sections of the population to use. The challenge is
to find an approach which allows a wider constituency to use the ombudsman
procedure to resolve consumer disputes, and this is something which most
ombudsmen try to address with help lines and staff specifically allocated to the
giving of advice and assistance. Some are happy to try to resolve complaints
over the phone, to obviate the necessity for form filling, and some of the smaller
schemes are able to organize visits to complainants.46
An issue which goes to accessibility and which has not yet been
satisfactorily addressed is the relationship between ombudsmen and the internal
complaints procedures within companies. Ombudsmen are designed to form the
top rung of an informal complaints ladder, with 'exhaustion' of the internal
procedure a prerequisite for access to the ombudsman, and the integrity of the
bottom rungs is of considerable importance to the consumer. Publicity for the
remedy is essential. Certainly in the United Kingdom there was evidence that
companies were not always wholehearted in their commitment to publicizing
either their own internal complaints process or the ombudsman.47 We suspect
that deficiencies may often result from a disparity of knowledge and
commitment between those in management and those at the counter. We also
suspect that it is not a problem specific to the United Kingdom. Certainly there
is anecdotal evidence to support this. In our survey work, one of the authors
made a spot check on an ATM and Investor Advice Centre close to the head
44. Klaus Viitanen, The Scandinavian Public Complaints Boards: The Aims, Present Situation and
the Future, ICONSUMER L.J. 118 (1996).
45. James & Seneviratne, supra note 28.
46. See Howells & James, supra note 21, for a discussion on the Canadian Banking Ombudsman.
47. C. Graham, M. Seneviratne & R. James, Publicising the Bank and Building Societies
Ombudsman Schemes, 3 CONSUMER POL'Y REV. 85 (1993); R. James, C. Graham & M. Seneviratne, Building
Societies, Customer Complaints, and the Ombudsman, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 214 (1994) (explaining that
it is something which will be largely remedied under the new FOS regime where the new industry regulator,
the Financial Services Authority, has responsibility for monitoring compliance with publicity rules).
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office of one particular Canadian bank immediately after having met the internal
'bank ombudsman'. This spot check revealed that there were no leaflets on how
to complain on view, or available on request, despite confident assertions made
earlier by the bank ombudsman that they were on display at every outlet,
however small.48
One reason for the importance of effective internal complaints procedures
is that they may form a barrier for the consumer to surmount rather than
providing the opportunity to have their complaint resolved at the earliest
opportunity. The desire to address the issue quickly lies behind much of the
argument for conciliation, and there is a trend for ombudsmen and many other
ADR systems to lay stress on initial conciliation. The President of the state-
funded Consumer Complaints Board in Norway, for example, believes that
consumers would benefit if the conciliation function of the Consumer Council
were strengthened, not least because of the time it takes the Board to deal with
cases. Two of the private complaints boards in Norway, for example, those for
banking and finance and for insurance also operate a form of conciliation.
Ombudsmen, too, are increasingly placing an emphasis on conciliation rather
than formal resolution of complaints and the head of the new Financial
Ombudsman Service in the United Kingdom has said he would like to see his
scheme operate a system where only a small minority of cases actually reach the
more formal stages of investigation and decision.49 Whether this emphasis is
really to the consumer's benefit or whether it is driven by managerial
considerations is not clear although we harbor a suspicion. It is a moot point if
consumers benefit most from resolution at an early stage when they may be
encouraged to compromise, or from having their claim examined and
determined by an independent adjudicator.
Conciliation is not the sole preserve of the ADR sector. Small claims
systems commonly provide for a variety of outcomes, including both agreed
settlements and decisions. In France, pre-trial conciliation allows one party to
bring the other before the court for an attempt at conciliation where a settlement
is believed to be possible.5° In British Columbia, the new small claims court
programme of 1991 introduced mandatory settlement conferences for disputed
claims.5 In New Zealand, referees are required to assess whether the matter is
appropriate for a settlement, and if so, to facilitate that process, but failing that
to give a decision in the same forum. 52 There is perhaps a distinction to be
drawn between systems which introduce such a mechanism to improve dispute
48. Howells & James, supra note 21.
49. W. Merricks, Presentation to the Biennial Conference of the British and Irish Ombudsman
Association, (May. 2001).
50. Howells & James, supra note 21.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Disputes Tribunals Act, 1988 (N.Z.)
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resolution outcomes and those which see mediation as a short cut to reducing
costs on the legal system. The German law permitting states to demand
arbitration in small claims cases perhaps falls into the latter category.
Arbitration, although possibly more accessible than the courts, where for
instance the fees are kept down by subsidies from trade associations, still
involves a degree of formality which may be off-putting to the consumer and
usually continues to involve costs for the consumer. In some instances the costs
may be prohibitively high in comparison with the amount at stake. 3
The hope was that small claims courts and tribunals would be accessible
and thus bring justice closer to the ordinary person but there is disquieting
evidence, in jurisdictions such as Canada, New Zealand and the UK, that a large
proportion of consumer disputes are initiated by traders rather than consumers -
what Ramsay has described as "the deformation of small claims courts into
collection agencies., 54 There is also evidence that the applicants tend to be
disproportionately male professionals or self employed and well educated.55
In the US, consumers may choose to take their claim to the small claims
courts which have a highly simplified procedure. There is no need for
representation and indeed in some states there is a prohibition on the use of
lawyers in these courts. The procedure is informal albeit it was originally based
on an adjudicative model, although some courts are now adopting modes of
ADR. Consumer cases would also commonly go to the Municipal Courts
(sometimes known as Magistrates Courts) which have a limited jurisdiction and
are staffed by a full-time judge - appointed or elected, depending on the
particular circumstances in the State. Formal court procedure is adopted, but
these courts also offer non-binding arbitration which can be voluntary or
mandatory, before getting to court, depending on the way the court operates.
It is this procedure which normally applies to consumer cases, normally up to
a limit of $15,000-$20,000, and the individual pays a filing fee of $100.
Interestingly, this type of consumer arbitration is non-binding, because when the
courts adopted the procedure they could not, under the Constitution, deny trial
rights. The arbitration procedure has the advantage of speed, as the hearing
would normally be held within a few months and the procedure would be
streamlined and less formal than an ordinary court. Lawyers can be hired for
a small fee and the consumer is not at risk of having to pay the other side's fees.
53. Richard M. Alderman, Mandatory Arbitration in the United States: The Destruction of
Consumer Rights, Presentation at the Eighth International Consumer Law Conference (Apr. 2001).
54. I. Ramsay, Consumer Access to Justice, Plenary Address at the Eighth International Consumer
Law Conference (Apr. 2001).
55. Howells & James, supra note 21; Seana C. McGuire & Roderick A. Macdonald, Judicial Scripts
in the Dramaturgy of the Small Claims Court, 11 CAN. J.L. & SOC'Y 63 (1996); Spiller, supra note 41;




In these court processes, however, there is still the perception that the business
'repeat player' will be at an advantage in comparison with the unrepresented
individual consumer. The point probably is that a way needs to be found to
provide low-cost legal advice and representation rather than to ban it. Early
neutral evaluation is used in other courts, for instance in some District Courts,
but while there might be potential for its use in consumer redress it seems at
present not to be used much in that setting.
It is recognized that most parties who attend a small claims process expect
and prefer it simply to hand down a decision, and that this reality needs to be
respected by the presiding officer.56 It is also recognized that there are practical
constraints on the extent to which there can be true mediation in the small
claims forum, bearing in mind time constraints, the fact that the
respondent/defendant attends involuntarily, and the role of the presiding officer
as an authority figure.57 Indeed it is unlikely that in small claims the ideal will
be achieved of the mediator and the decision-maker being different people.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that it is important for small claims process to
allow the flexibility to allow disputes to be settled where this is appropriate.
Although it should be recognized that many consumers may feel pressurized
into agreeing a settlement which deprives them of the full value of their claim,
nevertheless the parties' underlying needs may best be met through settlements
which they have fashioned and are committed to implementing. There is also
the hope that the experience of the consumer and the trader in resolving their
dispute will have a remedial and educative effect, not least in heightening the
sensitivity of the trader to the consumer's needs.
Cost is an issue with small claims courts and this varies amongst
jurisdictions. France, for example, has the admirable principle that the legal
system is a free service provided by the state (although since 1991 a tax has
been imposed on legal acts).58 New Zealand for many years operated on the
basis of low filing fees, but in 1998 an increased scale of fees from $30 to $200
has proved a deterrent to certain claimants, 59 and in the UK where the Civil
Procedure Rules do allow for a small claims track, there is discretion for the
judge as to whether this may be invoked and the court fees and allocation fee
(payable if a defense is entered) may prove a barrier to the consumer. These
fees remain fairly high even for small claims because of the political decision
that court fees must cover the cost of running the judicial infrastructure. This
56. E. Clark, A STUDY, THE TASMANIAN SMALL CLAIMS COURT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, (1992);
Spiller, supra note 41, at 98.
57. Id. at 90, 91.
58. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 7.
59. Disputes Tribunals Rule 5.
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is in contrast to the position in Ireland where the issuing fee is in the region of
£6.
The scale of cost is also determined by the involvement allowed for
lawyers. In jurisdictions such as Quebec and New Zealand, lawyers are
excluded from representing clients on either side, and in recognition of this
there is only limited scope in New Zealand for the award of costs in relation to
the proceedings. 60 Even in jurisdictions where lawyers are allowed there are
usually bars on recovery of lawyers' costs unless one party has behaved
unreasonably.
Again on accessibility, a concern arises as to the nature of the proceedings
and the degree of formality imposed by the judge. The involvement of lawyers
as representatives would seem on the face of it to engender an unhelpful
legalistic approach which is inimical to the aims of informality which may be
reinforced by the physical setting and the court building. However, the issue
may not be clear cut since there is some interesting evidence in Canada (other
than in Quebec) where some poverty groups have argued that the small claims
courts were intimidating for their clients and that reforms such as the
introduction of full time inquisitorial judges and duty counsel would make the
system more effective for the poor. The nature of the procedure has been
addressed in a number of jurisdictions, but with varying success. In France,
where consumer disputes are heard in the court system, albeit with simplified
procedures, research indicates that these courts are not particularly friendly to
individual consumers with small claims. Other jurisdictions provide for small
claims courts as distinct parts of the court system. In Quebec, small claims
court judges are regular, full-time judges of the Civil Division of the Court who
hear cases in the small claims court one day every other week.6' In New
Zealand, the Disputes Tribunals function as a division of the District Court and
claims are heard on court premises.62 Yet other jurisdictions, such as New South
Wales, have adopted specialist consumer claims tribunals.63 Indeed some
Australian states have separate tribunals to deal with credit disputes. There is
some evidence that small claims judges find the handling of disputes an
unpleasant aspect of their work. Clark noted that part-time small claims judges
had difficulty switching to this role from their normal duties and that in
Tasmania satisfaction was greater where one judge specialized in this type of
work.64 In Canada, it was found that work in the small claims court was not
popular with the judiciary and was seen as a demotion. Judges in these courts
60. Disputes Tribunals Act, 38, 43, 1988 (N.Z.)
61. Disputes Tribunals Act, 27, 1988 (N.Z.)
62. Disputes Tribunals Act, 4, 1988 (N.Z.); Spiller, supra note 41, at 10.
63. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 44.
64. CLARK, supra note 56.
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were found not to be particularly good at recognizing the issues being presented
by individuals, and there was a mismatch between the perception of the problem
on the part of the individual and the way in which the legal system, even at
small claims court level, characterized it.
65
A recurrent feature of forums designed for small claims is that there is a
large measure of flexibility in the procedures used, to respond to the needs of
the parties and their situation. In Quebec, small claims judges are authorized to
use the procedure which seems most appropriate.66 In New Zealand, referees
who preside in the Disputes Tribunals may adopt such procedure as is best
suited to the ends of justice and may receive any relevant evidence even if not
legally admissible in a court of law.67 This informality enhances the important
role played by the personality of the adjudicator. The situation in New Zealand
is striking, as the vast majority of referees are not legally trained. Baldwin
noted in the UK that the atmosphere of small claims courts varied markedly
even within the same building depending on the character of the judge.68 Could
these individual idiosyncrasies be altered by better training?
Plaintiffs who make it as far as a small claims hearing have had to
overcome a number of obstacles and the strong temptation must often have been
to drop the claim somewhere along the line. Those who get to the small claims
court represent the tip of the iceberg. Baldwin, in his research in the United
Kingdom, found that in talking to small claims litigants many had found it an
uphill struggle to pursue the action as far as the county court. He believes it is
not enough to provide improved facilities or to expand the scope of informal
procedures or to encourage judges to become pro-active: the greater problem
is to persuade people confronting serious legal difficulties to make use of the
courts and other legal processes. Public awareness of small claims procedures
and alternative methods of resolving disputes is very low, and public attitudes
to the courts in general remain resistant. For large sections of the population,
the courts are seen as uninviting, even forbidding institutions to be visited only
in extreme circumstances. They are places to which they are 'taken'; not
somewhere they use to settle disputes, or have their grievances resolved.
In Canada, McGuire and Macdonald's conclusion has been that:
the use of the court is often correlated with those socio-demographic
variables associated with social power and that structural modifications to
processes of civil litigation designed to enhance access to justice do not
significantly alter the character of any court's plaintiff pool. Whatever may be
the benefits of creating systems of small claims courts, the empirical evidence
65. Ramsay, supra note 54.
66. Id. at 227.
67. Disputes Tribunals Act, 40, 44, 1988 (N.Z.)
68. BALDWIN, supra note 26.
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suggests that greater accessibility of official institutions of dispute resolution is
not one of them.69
That point, so powerfully made, should give one pause for thought.
VIII. FAIRNESS
The next benchmark, fairness, entails that the scheme produces decisions
which are fair and seen to be fair by observing the principles of procedural
fairness, by making decisions on the information before it, and by having
specific criteria upon which its decisions are based. Decisions should be based
on what is fair and reasonable, taking into account good industry practice,
relevant industry codes and the law. Procedurally, due process or natural justice
requirements should be observed. An obligation to provide information should
be placed on scheme members, subject to certain limitations. These
requirements seem to have been written with the private ombudsman in mind.
One issue, however, is the extent to which consumers are satisfied by the normal
paper-only ombudsman procedure. It is a moot point whether having a paper-
based scheme is to the consumer's advantage. Whilst it certainly removes the
intimidation of the 'day in court', it may be that some consumers are less able
to articulate their views on paper than orally. There is also some evidence that
consumers place a high value on 'being heard' whether in person or on the
telephone and that an important element in their satisfaction with the system is
the feeling that their complaint has been understood and been recognized in
some sense by an independent person.7" Adoption of a more personal approach
as a general rule would result in massively increased costs, which might result
in a charge having to be made to the consumer, and it would also have
implications for the speed and informality of procedures, which are currently
part of the ombudsman hallmark.
As to the courts, in New Zealand, there is an important emphasis on the
procedures of natural justice in that there are grounds for appeal where
proceedings have been conducted unfairly and this unfairness has prejudicially
affected the outcome.7 Furthermore, there is review to the High Court on the
basis of breach of natural justice.72 While the number of appeals is low and the
number of successful appeals lower still, and judicial review is rare, the
presence of these safeguards acts as an important incentive to referees to pursue
fair procedures.77
69. McGuire & MacDonald, supra note 27.
70. See Birds & Graham, supra note 28, for research into the views of complainants who had used
the estate agent's scheme in the UK; See also James & Seneviratne, supra note 28.
71. Disputes Tribunals Act, 50, 1988 (N.Z.)
72. Spiller, supra note 41, at 137.
73. Id. at 136-137.
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Clark is, however, troubled as to whether the right balance has been struck
in Australia concerning informality of proceedings and deviations from the rules
of evidence, limitation on rights of appeal etc. He notes Pound's view that there
is a "continual movement in legal history back and forth between wide
discretion and strict detailed rule, between justice without law, as it were, and
justice according to law' 74 and clearly sees small claims and ADR procedures
as being at the very end of the discretionary spectrum. He points out that many
of the legal rules which are being pushed aside in the name of seeking justice
were in fact introduced to ensure justice was delivered. His motivation for
raising this concern about informality is his finding that people cared most about
being given a fair opportunity to present their case and that too much emphasis
should not therefore be placed on fast and cheap justice. However, one can
agree with Clark that it is important that participants see the process as fair and
permitting them the chance to present their cases fully, without resorting to
technical legal institutions to achieve these goals. Again, much will depend
upon enhancing the training for judges and court staff and developing better
information to users. If small claims procedures become too complex there is
a danger of killing the goose that lays the golden egg.
In New Zealand referees are directed to decide in terms of the substantial
merits and justice. They are not bound by strict legal technicalities and forms,
and may disregard contractual terms which appear harsh or unconscionable.75
Indeed in Hertz NZ Ltd. v. Disputes Tribunal,76 a decision was upheld even
though the court admitted the appellant was not and could not be liable at law.
There is, then, a strong emphasis on common-sense justice rather than legalistic
outcomes. However, referees are required to have regard to the law, and it is a
ground of appeal that a referee did not have regard to the provision of an
enactment brought to the attention of the referee at the hearing.77
Similar rules are found in Australian small claims courts. In Queensland
and New South Wales, for instance there is provision that the final order must
be "fair and equitable", thus giving the judge leeway to deviate from the strict
letter of the law.78 Nevertheless, their impact has not been as great as in New
Zealand, because the decisions have continued to be made by lawyers.79 Indeed
it would be an impossible burden to require lay referees to make decisions
according to the law.
One of the interesting issues is whether New Zealand adopts this approach
on the pragmatic basis that within the time and cost limitations of the New
74. Clark, supra note 56.
75. Disputes Tribunals Act, 18-19, 1988 (N.Z.)
76. 8 P.R.N.Z. 145 (1994).
77. Disputes Tribunals Act, 18, 50, 1988 (N.Z.)
78. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 46.
79. Spiller, supra note 41.
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Zealand system it is not possible to deliver perfect justice.8" Alternatively was
the system recognizing that laws could be imperfect and that the tribunals would
be able to deliver better justice if they looked at the substantial merits of the
case? There are some hints of the latter approach, for example when a time limit
is ignored which would operate against a meritorious party. On the whole,
however, the impression gained is that justice according to the law is an ideal
which has to be departed from on cost grounds. Indeed one of the fears of some
commentators8' is the suspicion that this power could be used against
consumers. There is a difference between the use of a flexible power of this sort
to deliver substantive justice when wielded by an ombudsman within a structure
which requires him to justify his use of the power, and the placing of a similar
power in the hands of a referee. In the final analysis, however, the result of the
New Zealand approach may be simply to make explicit what happens in most
small claims courts, for Baldwin's research indicates that many District Judges
in the United Kingdom are happy to depart from the law to achieve a just result
despite being formally bound by the law. Nevertheless one might be cautious
about the extent to which one is willing to accept adjudication according to
substantive justice rather than law. Given the background and training of the
modem referees one can expect them to make a good effort to reach fair
decisions, which do not treat consumers unfairly. To the extent that there are
injustices, one can be reasonably sanguine if the alternative is simply a legal
system which prevents small disputes being heard at all. However of course this
position is less defensible the higher the monetary amount involved.
The EC principle of legality goes further than the benchmark and is
concerned to reinforce the need to preserve strict legal protection which may
look strange to those in countries with well developed ADR systems. It
stipulates that the consumer must not be deprived of the protection of the
mandatory provisions of the law of the state in whose territory the dispute
resolution body is established nor should the consumer be deprived of the
protection afforded by the mandatory provisions applying under the law of the
Member State in which he is normally resident. The first point is covered in
most ombudsman systems where the consumer is free to reject the decision and
go to court instead. Arbitration is usually binding on both parties, however.
The second point, seems to present practical problems. Is it realistic to expect
national ADR systems to have specialist knowledge of legal systems within
other Member States or, perhaps, globally? And indeed, if the consumer is given
the choice to use an informal out of court procedure with its attendant benefits,
80. Kate Tokeley, Disputes Tribunals: Should the Monetary Limits Have Been Increased?, 5 N.Z.




is it not a reasonable trade-off that any legal rights available in their own
country are relinquished?
IX. ACCOUNTABILITY
The benchmark on accountability requires that the redress scheme should
publicly account for its operations by publishing its determinations and
information about complaints and highlighting any systemic industry problems.
This includes the provision of anonymous written reports of determinations to
scheme members and interested bodies both to provide guidance and to
demonstrate consistency and fairness in decision-making. There should also be
an annual report providing, inter alia, a statistical breakdown of complaints,
representative case studies, and highlighting systemic problems. Much of this
is mirrored in the EC principle of transparency.
Ombudsmen and complaints boards broadly meet these requirements,
although arbitration procedures usually do not. A drawback of many ADR
systems stems from the private nature of the process which enables companies
to settle disputes without public acknowledgement of their failings. While the
state funded Scandinavian Complaints Boards do make full details publicly
available, in private schemes case reports are normally on an anonymised basis,
and this includes those private complaints boards in Scandinavia as well as the
private ombudsmen.82 There is an exception. In the Canadian Banking
Ombudsman scheme there are quite stringent reporting requirements where the
ombudsman is required to report quarterly on the number of cases where he has
made a recommendation, and cases where the bank has followed his
recommendation. These figures identify the banks concerned and are made
public. This goes a long way further than reporting requirements in other
jurisdictions where ombudsmen commonly simply report anonymised case
reports. (In one private scheme in the UK, the Building Societies Ombudsman,
the naming of a building society and details of an ombudsman award against it
was available as an option to any society that was disinclined to abide by the
ombudsman's decision. In the event, only two societies took the option during
the scheme's existence). Ombudsmen have generally been assiduous to identify
common problems in their Annual Reports that have gone some way towards
raising public awareness (if only amongst consumer groups and academics) of
the systemic problems which affect consumers.
82. See for example, the Norwegian Bureau for Insurance Disputes and the Complaints Board for
Consumers in Banking and Finance Matters in Norway.
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X. EFFICIENCY
The efficiency benchmark,83 which requires that schemes should keep track
of complaints, ensure they are dealt with by the appropriate process or forum
and should regularly review their own performance is now broadly met by
ombudsman schemes which have become increasingly aware of the need to
ensure a speedy and stream-lined process and one which they can defend under
scrutiny from outside observers. There should also be a system for tracking
complaints, notifying the parties of progress, and provision for regular
monitoring. How well arbitration and small claims courts match these
requirements is unclear although case management is assuming greater
importance if only on financial grounds.
XI. EFFECTIVENESS
Finally, the effectiveness benchmark's measure is that the scheme should
have appropriate and comprehensive terms of reference and periodic
independent reviews of its performance. This is closely linked to the efficiency
benchmark but with the former focusing on the operation of the scheme the
effectiveness benchmark measures the capacity of the scheme to deliver justice.
Schemes should therefore be broad enough to cover the majority of customer
complaints, up to monetary limits which are consistent with customer
transactions in that industry.
Determinations must be binding on members and members must be
encouraged to abide by the rules of the scheme. As regards most of the
Scandinavian Complaints Boards where the awards were not enforceable, there
was a poor rate of compliance with recommendations, in some cases only 50%,
in others only 30-40 %. Bad publicity or the encouragement of consumers to
take legal action in the court if a recommendation has not been complied with
have not proved particularly successful sanctions.84 The Norwegian Consumer
Complaints Board whose decisions are enforceable if the parties do not request
that the matter goes to court within four weeks is able to give assistance to the
consumer to obtain enforcement if this proves necessary. While only a minority
of cases go on to court there had been in 1999 a rash of cases going to court
involving disputes about professional services.85
83. There is no direct equivalent EC principle on these matters although the principle of
transparency covers similar points.
84. Viitanen, supra note 44.
85. This Board received comparatively few complaints. In 1999 it received 256 in total; as to the
category of complaints, those about cars constituted the largest total in number (45), of complaints about
services those relating to building work topped the list at 18 with electrical work next at 12.
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Private ombudsman schemes have a good record on compliance, in most
instances the company settles on the ombudsman's recommendation without a
formal award having to be made and awards have been invariably followed.
This is true in both voluntary and statutory schemes. For the new Financial
Ombudsman Service, statute provides for enforcement of the awards in the
86
county court at the instance of the consumer.
It is interesting that the EC principle of liberty goes further on the issue of
binding awards and requires that the decision taken by the body concerned may
be binding on the parties only if they were informed of its binding nature in
advance and specifically accepted that. Further, the consumer's recourse to the
out-of-court procedure must not be the result of a commitment prior to the
materialization of the dispute, where such commitment has the effect of
depriving the consumer of her right to bring an action before the courts for the
settlement of the dispute. The importance of this provision is sharpened when
one considers the situation in the US where the courts have largely upheld
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion even in circumstances
where the consumer was given wholly inadequate notice.87 Indeed, it has been
argued that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, as employed in the US, is
designed to preclude effective redress by consumers and substantially reduce or
eliminate the beneficial effects of favorable judicial precedent and legislation.88
For the consumer in the US, arbitration has significant defects: it is often not
as prompt or inexpensive as the small claims courts, the informal rules often
favor the company as the repeat player and mandatory arbitration precludes the
consumer's freedom to choose to litigate as a class action.89
In countries where the ombudsman remedy pertains, the consumer is free
to go to court at any time up until acceptance of the ombudsman's
determination. Nevertheless, the point has been well made elsewhere that,
given the practical realities, recourse to the courts may only be a theoretical
alternative. 90
86. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, 3, c. 8, s. 229, sched. 17.
87. Richard M. Alderman, Mandatory Arbitration in the United States: The Destruction of
Consumer Rights, Presentation at the Eighth International Consumer Law Conference, (Apr. 2001).
88. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Alderman, supra note 86; Mary Dee
Pridgen, Gateway to Justice: Arbitration Imposed on U.S. consumers by Adhesion Contracts, Presentation
at the Eighth International Consumer Law Conference, (Apr. 2001); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 33 (1997).
89. Alderman, supra note 86; Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets The Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
90. Philip Rawlings & Chris Willet, Ombudsman Schemes in the United Kingdom's Financial
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It is usually implicit in an arbitration process that both parties agree to be
bound by the arbitrator's decision and this certainly pertains in the UK,
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal for example. Although agreements in EC
countries are subject to provisions arising from the EC Directive on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts. 9'
As to small claims courts and tribunals, it would seem to be essential that
the outcome of the small claims process be binding and effective, subject to the
earlier discussion above about conciliation. There is little point in either
consumer or trader initiating and pursuing a process which has inevitable
financial and emotional cost and which ends with an outcome that makes no
difference. Unfortunately, even obtaining a judgment is not the end of the
matter. The reality is that many judgments debtors do not voluntarily comply
with court orders, and law enforcement officers are unable to exact fulfillment
of the order (because of the party's lack of means, disappearance or
bankruptcy). The experience of many litigants in obtaining remedies which are
not complied with, and which sometimes can never be enforced, has caused
some observers to question the value of the small claims system.9"
Small claims systems commonly provide for enforcement of outcomes of
the process, either because the small claims system is part of the court process
or because there is provision for registration of the outcome for purposes of
enforcement. In New Zealand, orders for the payment of money or the delivery
of property automatically become orders of the District Court and are
enforceable through the court process.93 In Victoria, there is a "funds in trust"
model, whereby if a consumer disputes payment of an account the money must
be paid by the consumer into a trust account until the order is decided.94
It is recognized that the enforceability of court orders is an issue not only
for the small claims process: throughout the court process, there is the
experience of successful litigants being unable to translate their orders into
tangible benefit. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it is essential that the orders
of small claims forums be given the maximum support possible by the state if
citizens are to have faith in their justice system.
Under the effectiveness benchmark, schemes should also be designed to
pick up systemic problems, and here it may be important, ironically, that the
dispute 'goes the distance' so that a record is kept of the type of issues involved.
Most complaints boards and ombudsmen claim some success in influencing
good practice, particularly those which are industry specific. In some settings,
Sector: The Insurance Ombudsman, the Banking Ombudsman, and the Building Societies Ombudsman, 17
J. CONSUMER POL'Y 307 (1994).
91. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L95) 29.
92. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 47, 56.
93. Disputes Tribunals Act, 45, 1988 (N.Z.)
94. Howells & James, supra note 21, at 47.
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the Norwegian complaints boards for example, decisions of these ADR bodies
are taken into account by the courts in comparable cases so that there is the
potential, at least, for benefit to the collective consumer interest by the
influencing of judicial precedent. Ombudsmen have had some influence in
identifying systemic problems within an industry although their effectiveness
here has been tempered by the willingness or otherwise of an industry to accept
the strictures of the ombudsman. In many instances, changes in practice have
seemed rather slow moving to the onlooker, and changes to policy infrequent.
Some ombudsmen have regularly been consulted about industry codes of
practice; it may well be time to give them increased powers in this area.
XII. SUMMARY
Forms of redress for the individual consumer dispute have the potential at
least to provide an adequate mode of resolution, but they have yet to meet their
promise. Small claims courts or tribunals have yet to become truly accessible
to the more vulnerable consumer, and there is a debate as to whether or not
access to (free) legal assistance is a benefit or not. Certainly Capelletti's first
wave of economic assistance is not very apparent for consumers litigating small
claims (this applies a fortiori in the ADR sector). Moreover, while decisions
may be authoritative, in some jurisdictions at least the consumer can be left high
and dry if enforcement of judgment is problematic. Again, the role and
commitment of the adjudicator is crucial; where the judge is a reluctant one then
the consumer is unlikely to get the "best" justice.
Arbitration, while less formal than the courts, seems to us to have
considerable disadvantages for the consumer. The consumer is likely to incur
considerable costs through the arbitration fee, and costs for any expert witnesses
etc. While arbitrators are drawn from independent panels, there will be an
advantage to the company as repeat player both structurally and informally and
the consumer usually has to agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision.
Here, developments in the US towards mandatory binding arbitration are of
particular concern.
Consumer Complaints Boards and Ombudsmen are assuming considerable
importance in terms of the number of consumer complaints with which they
deal, and the implicit acceptance in many jurisdictions that they are not
alternative forms of resolution for particular disputes, but the only form of
dispute resolution for all but the most unusual consumer who has the time,
money, and willingness to take the long road through the ordinary court system.
They provide a helpful remedy which is free, accessible, informal, and, in the
case of ombudsmen, they are able to make considerable financial awards where
appropriate (where awards are not formally binding, recommendations have
usually become de facto binding). The consumer can reject the award and go
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to the courts. But there have been doubts about the perceived independence of
the ombudsman in some of the industry sponsored schemes and the remedy is
not always as speedy as the informality of the processes would promise. Most
are able to depart from the law and codes of practice to take decisions based on
what is fair and reasonable; this allows them to do justice in the individual case
unencumbered by strict precedent but with the consequence of potential
unpredictability for future consumers and companies in dispute.
Capelletti's third procedural wave is therefore evidenced in some strength
in particular areas of consumer redress but even so, and even where the forms
of ADR are apparently strong, close examination reveals inadequacies which
have yet to redress the structural imbalance between the parties. More needs to
be done to subject the modes of dispute resolution to scrutiny and to effect
change.
There is too, another concern. The issue of individualized justice, as
against such rule of law considerations as certainty and consistency, has a
further dimension. The general consumer interest is better served if conclusions
can be drawn from individual decisions. It is desirable that decisions form more
than mere guidance to the industry concerned and have in some measure the
value of precedent. Can this be achieved in a system which rightly values
speed, accessibility, and probably the desire to resolve disputes at the earliest
level? ADR is commonly a private form of justice; while it may be successful
for the individual consumer, its essential characteristics seem by their very
nature to rule out the wider role of creating beneficial precedent for future
consumers. Some forms of ADR, notably ombudsmen, are making brave
attempts to draw attention to system weaknesses and to bring about change.
However, there are factors preventing the regulatory wave taking hold with ease
in ADR and small claims jurisdictions.
The increased use of mediation, or conciliation, to try to reach a conclusion
may be of benefit to the individual consumer but there is insufficient evidence
at present to make a judgment about it and it takes consumer redress even
further from the public gaze. Justice behind closed doors can only have a
minimal effect on corporate policy and behavior.
The crucial next step is to take action against systemic problems and to find
a way of addressing the collective consumer interest. This is where our call for
a sixth integrative wave to allow a cross-fertilization between the courts and
ADR institutions has importance. The court's power to make decisions public,
and the impetus which comes from the ability of some ADR systems to draw
attention to corporate practices and policies which are detrimental to consumers
could, if brought together, make a significant impact for all consumers,
including those who do not even get as far as seeking redress. One way of
achieving this might be to open small claims courts and ADR procedures up to
the type of collective procedures seen in main stream litigation i.e. class actions,
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injunction procedures etc. These collective procedures will be considered next
before the cross-border dimension is focused on. However, it should also be
noted that small claims and ADR schemes will also increasingly have to
consider how they can handle cross-border disputes or be honest in admitting
that they are not suitable for them and encouraging appropriate alternatives to
be developed.
XIII. COLLECTIVE CLAIMS
The use of collective actions is a good example of Cappelletti's second
wave of organizational changes. There is a trend both towards making it easier
to bring civil actions through procedures analogous to class action procedures
and the development of public law style controls permitting government bodies
and consumer organizations to seek injunctions. To some extent collective
actions also link to the economic trend Cappelletti noted as they can be a
mechanism for making access to justice more affordable. It also fits into the
regulatory wave we noted for this type of litigation often has a broader political
concern to protect the public interest (even where cases are framed as the
protection of private rights). They can also be a mechanism for making cross-
border litigation viable and thus feeds into the globalization wave. Such
mechanisms need to be adapted to the new consumer litigation climate by
incorporating them into the new ADR procedures, for otherwise one could have
the situation where the legal system had developed the means to represent the
consumer collective interest at the very time these sorts of claims were being
litigated outside the court system.
This section covers both the collective litigation of individual claims for
damages and the use of actions to settle points of dispute in a prospective
manner. One of the problems in this area is to categorise the many different
types of collective action available. It is possible, for instance, to distinguish
between regimes where the litigation in theory remains under the control of
private parties (which we label private interest collective litigation) and where
some third party takes control such as a public body or NGO like a consumer
organization (public interest collective litigation). At the heart of many of the
debates in this area is the question of whether there is a collective consumer
interest over and above the sum of the individual claims. We think there
certainly is, at least to the extent of ensuring the law can regulate market failures
where individuals may not have adequate incentives to act against wrongdoing.
It is possible to see the large-scale personal injury problem as falling into
the private interest collective action model and other consumer claims falling
into the public interest category. The private interest collective action procedure
could then be seen as having less of a political dimension. Instead, it could be
viewed as a means of permitting access to the courts to those whose interest
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would not otherwise be represented and as a means of increasing efficiency by
reducing costs and helping the courts manage a workload which otherwise
might threaten to overwhelm the court system. However, the position is not so
black and white. Some large-scale personal injury cases certainly have a
political agenda. The tobacco litigation in the US is one such example. The
Agent Orange case is another good example where the litigation involved more
than the sum of its individual parts, for in addition to compensation many of the
claimants sought to shame the Government for the way they had treated
Vietnam veterans.95 On the other hand, there are some examples of public
bodies and consumer groups being able to assist individuals recover damages.96
Nevertheless, private action collective actions for large amounts, such as
large-scale personal injury (and to some extent financial service) claims, often
raise quite different issues from the public interest collective action which is the
focus of our concern. The debate concerning private interest collective actions
often concerns the question of whether claimants grouping together to press
claims for large amounts of money is an unfair threat to defendants. The
debates tend to center around whether individual assessments of causation and
damages dominate the common issues to such an extent that it is pointless to
bring a collective action. Defendants have argued that the system is wrong to
force them to expend a lot of resources defending generic issues without testing
the underlying strength of the particular cases at hand.97
However, if, what is being considered in a collective action is a point of
principle removed for the issue of compensation, then one might overcome
these objections. We shall see that there is a modern trend to grant standing
(especially within the EC) to consumer groups and public bodies charged with
protecting consumers to seek injunctions in cases involving matters such as
unfair terms, advertising and trade practices. Indeed, this use of the class action
as a form of legislative adjudication is more in keeping with the historical
origins of the representative action in common law as a way of defining the
rules that governed feudal relations.98 For some, the modern notion of the class
action for damages sits uneasily in a legal system which requires that
individuals satisfy all elements of their claim.99 Although such objections seem
to be aimed at the personal injury class action, similar sentiments seem to
underpin those who argue that the line should be drawn at collective injunctions
to protect the consumer interest and that damages should not be available in
such cases. However, we believe a case can be made out for damages to be
95. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1987).
96. See The Australian Consumer and Competition Commission, supra note 9.
97. See CRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS, (2001).
98. Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 6 (1977).
99. H.P. Glenn, The Dilemna of Class Action Reform, 6 Oxford J. LEGAL STUD. 262 (1986).
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recovered in collective actions involving small scale but widely disseminated
consumer detriment in order to ensure there is no unjust enrichment (although
the manner of distributing the compensation may involve innovative techniques
rather than simply paying sums over to individuals). Thus a role remains for
private interest collective action procedures in protecting the consumer interest.
The problem is not so evident where large amounts are at stake, as in these cases
consumers can often obtain legal assistance under contingency or conditional
fee arrangements. The challenge is to find ways where consumers who have
suffered small amounts of detriment individually, can group together to make
litigation a viable option. Indeed this underlines our central argument that
consumer litigation needs more than modification of existing principles, it needs
new principles structured to respond to the needs of consumers.
XIV. PRIVATE INTEREST COLLECTIVE ACTION PROCEDURES
Defining a private interest collective action procedure is a difficult task.
There are at least three models for how the courts can handle claims brought be
large numbers of consumers - the test case approach, the representative action
and a dedicated class or group action procedure.
XV. TEST CASES
The traditional way would be for lawyers to bring test cases and for claims
to be settled in the wake of the test cases. The problem with such an approach
for claimants is that it does not permit them to benefit fully from the advantages
that should be available if many consumers have similar claims. These include
economies of scale; sharing of legal and expert costs and potential liability for
the other sides' costs (at least in a system where the loser pays rule applies);
demonstrating the full impact of the defendant's conduct and novel
opportunities for fashioning appropriate remedies. From the defendant's
perspective it does not produce the desired finality to such claims as new claims
can be lodged so long as they fall within limitation periods. The courts also do
not have the necessary control over such actions so as to reduce the impact of
such mass claims on the machinery of justice.
XVI. REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
Where claims are similar a representative action has traditionally been
possible in some common law systems. In England such actions had initially
been thwarted by the rule that they were not available for damage claims as each
case was considered to be unique. In England, this particular restriction has
now been overcome and indeed even before the development of a group
litigation order there was a greater willingness to adapt procedures to group
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litigation."0 The strictures of the procedure meant it never really functioned
well, however, in some common law countries like Canada. In Australia the
representative action has also proven to be less malleable, despite some good
intentions. For instance, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Carnie v.
Esanda Finance Corp., a case involving a challenge to interest charged, had
first rejected attempts to use a representative action as each credit transaction
was viewed as discrete and not a series of transactions.10' The High Court of
Australia took a more liberal approach admitting the approach in principle,10 2
but when the matter was remitted back to Mr. Justice Young, his order requiring
the parties to give notice to all other parties made the action impracticable. 103
Such a course of action may have been necessary for the defendants had adopted
the divisive tactic of only seeking interest against those who were a party to the
proceedings, but this only underlines the need for a more sophisticated
procedure than the representative action.
The approach in Victoria was to introduce a new representative action on
a statutory basis.'04 However, the judiciary remained resistant. In Marino v.
Esanda Ltd., 5 they interpreted the rules restrictively in the face of the clear
legislative intent and held a representative action was not appropriate as the
borrowers had separate contracts.
In 1986 a new representative action was introduced by ss 34-35 of the
Supreme Court Act. This was essentially an opt-in scheme available where
three of more persons have the right to the same or essentially the same relief
and some common question of law or fact would arise irrespective of whether
the claims arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Again the
judges were not sympathetic. In Bellotti v. Zentahope Pty Ltd., they criticized
the brevity of the rule describing it as "an attempt to break a butterfly upon a
wheel: the gear is ill-fitted to the task, raising more problems than it can
conveniently bear, yet offering greater torment than the subject deserves"' 6 and
suggested there were so many ambiguities that virtually no case could be
brought under it and that joinder provisions were a better way forward. The
analogy with joinder provisions is perhaps appropriate to some extent under an
opt-in procedure and the opt-out nature of most class action procedures serves
100. Horrocks v. Ford Motor Co., TIMES (London), Feb. 15, 1990; See generally Howells & James,
supra note 21; H. Koch & A. Willingmann, GROSSSCHADEN: RECHTLICHE UND ALTERNATIVE
REGULIERUNGSSTRATEGIAN IM IN-UND AUSLAND- COMPLEX DAMAGES, (1998).
101. 29 N.S.W.L.R. 382 (1992).
102. Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corp., 127 A.L.R.76 (1995).
103. (1996) ASC 56-336.
104. S. 62(IC).
105. 1986 V.R. 735.
106. 1992 BC9203164 3474 at 19.
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to distinguish them from representative actions. Although there is no clear
borderline between the two types of private interest collective action procedures.
The criticism of the brevity of the rules touches on a sensitive issue.
Detailed rules undoubtedly promote certainty, which is an element which is
highly sought after in most legal systems. On the other hand, it also reduces
flexibility. We shall see in the next section the contrast between the United
States class action and the United Kingdom group litigation order. The United
States class action has strict criteria, but relatively established pathways once
the gateway is opened. By contrast the United Kingdom system has laxer entry
criteria, but then leaves the judge with a great deal of discretion as to how far
and for what aspects of the litigation he departs from the model adopted for
individual redress.
XVII. CLASS ACTIONS
The class action is a prime example of Cappelletti' s second organizational
wave, where the legal system adapted to the changes needs by developing new
organizational structures. The United States class action procedure found in
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and mirrored in each United
States state, is the most famous example. However, similar models have also
been developed in Canada in Ontario, British Columbia °7 and even the civil law
jurisdiction of Quebec. 108 Australia also has an effective class action procedure
at the federal level as well as a less well functioning scheme in South Australia
with reform being discussed in other states. The United Kingdom now has the
Group Litigation Order (GLO) procedure.'0 9 Civil law countries have generally
been more conservative in their procedural reform, but we have seen that
Quebec has a class action procedure and France has some mechanisms which
seek the same results, but in a French way through using consumer associations
as the bodies responsible for developing group actions.
Traditionally, following the United States model, class actions have
required certification. This can be a very important stage in litigation for the
viability of the claim may depend upon whether the court accepts to hear them
as class actions. There are, however, some recent trends to make certification
less crucial. The Australian Federal procedure for instance has no certification
stage and the making of a GLO in the United Kingdom is less like an all or
nothing step. Nevertheless most systems have some requirements before such
a process is permitted.
107. J. Prestage & G. McKee, 'Class Actions in the Common Law Provinces of Canada' in Multi-
Party Actions, C. Hodges (ed.).
108. See an Act Respecting the Class Action, Chapter R-2.1.
109. R. Civ. P. 19(11), 48; See generally M. MILDRED, GROUP ACTIONS IN THE LAW OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY, (2000).
2002]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
Some systems specify a minimum number of parties. The United States
requires the class be so numerous as to make joinder impracticable, whilst the
Australian Federal procedure requires seven. In Ontario and British Columbia,
two suffice to form a class. The United Kingdom's GLO is silent on this issue.
In practice this is not as crucial as the test for determining whether a class action
is desirable.
The United States has three criteria for class actions to cover different
situations. Where damages are being claimed, the issue is usually framed as
whether "the questions of law or fact common to the class as a whole
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that the
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."" ° In other jurisdictions the test is less strict.
In Ontario and British Columbia for instance, the claims must raise common
(but not necessarily identical issues) and be the preferable procedure for
resolving the common issues, not necessarily all the issues. In the Australian
Federal procedure, the claim must simply arise out of the same, similar or
related circumstances and there must be a common question of law or fact
arising with respect to all the claims. The United Kingdom's GLO is the most
flexible as it is simply a form of case management and can apply to claims
which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law.
In the United States, there have been some high profile cases where rule
23 (b)(3) has been used for mass tort cases, such as the recent tobacco case of
Engle,"' where a state wide class action against tobacco companies resulted in
a $144 billion award of punitive damages. Indeed, in an asbestos case,
certification was upheld as it was seen to be the best way to conclude litigation,
for the court said "there may be cases in which class resolution of one issue or
a small group of them will so advance the litigation that they may be fairly said
to predominate." ' 12 But the majority view is that "The ill-advised deployment
of the class action technique imposes a relatively cumbersome format on largely
personal disputes, while achieving very little, if any, gain in efficiency and
economy."'"13 Also, the flexible remedy regime which is a hallmark of the
United States system is more suited to smaller consumer claims where aggregate
damages make more sense than in litigation involving significant individual
damages.
The United States use of class actions to remedy mass small scale
consumer abuses is worth dwelling on for one characteristic of the collective
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
111. This award was made in Dade County on July 14, 2000.
112. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 1986).
113. Pasternak v. The Upjohn Co., 92 CV 5987, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21078 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see
also Amchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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action elsewhere is that in its private interest version it has predominantly been
used for personal injury litigation, rather than this type of mass small scale
consumer problem. One sentiment driving the Americans is undoubtedly the
notion of access to justice. This was eloquently expressed by Judge Weinstein
who thought: "this matter touches on the credibility of our judicial system.
Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts to provide a forum for the
adjudication of disputes involving our citizens - including.. .consumers who
overpay for products because of anti-trust violations.. -or we are not."' 14 Part
of the explanation for the importance of this form of legal action in the United
States is revealed in the next quote which well illustrates the role of the class
action in the United States as not merely a means to provide individual justice
but also as a method of controlling business behavior in the absence of public
forms of control:
to consumerists, the consumer class action is an inviting procedural
device to cope with frauds causing small damages to large groups.
The slight loss to the individual, when aggregates in the coffers of the
wrongdoer, results in gains which are both handsome and tempting.
The alternatives to the class action - private suits or government
actions - have so often been found wanting in controlling consumer
frauds that not even the ardent critics of class actions seriously
contend that they are truly effective. The consumer class action,
when brought by those who have no other avenue of legal redress,
provides restitution to the injured, and deterrence of the wrongdoer.' '
In other systems a similar function may be played by public law
enforcement or action by consumer organizations. The distinguishing
characteristic of the United States approach is that it can deliver damages to
individuals and fully recover from businesses the profits they made. There is
a marked reluctance in other systems to provide compensation based on such
mass small-scale widely disbursed damage claims. There is also less incentive
for lawyers to become involved, for unlike in the United States, there is rarely
the functional equivalents of contingent fees and special statutory provisions
concerning recovery of attorney fees in consumer protection statutes. However,
a criticism of these consumer class actions in the United States is that very few
consumers actually recover meaningful compensation. The criticism is that in
return for say a discount voucher as compensation, lawyers often settle the cases
114. Excerpt from a Symposium before the Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, quoted in a
National Consumer Law Centre Publication (1973) FED. R. Civ. P. 58, 299, 305.
115. Jonathan Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and
the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 3 (1974).
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on terms where the amount of lawyer's fees recovered from the defendant is the
prime bargaining issue.
The United States National Consumer Law Center has advised lawyers to
consider bringing class actions under Rule 23(b)(2), as this usually removes the
need for notice until the central liability issues have been settled. This
authorizes a class action where "The party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole." However, as this again involves no damages
flowing to the injured parties the outcome for most consumers may not be too
different under the United States procedure than under other systems depending
more upon public enforcement.
A significant differentiating feature is whether class action procedures are
of the opt-in or opt-out variety. Closely connected to this is the issue of notice,
which is clearly most crucial in an opt-out system which has the capacity to bind
individuals, although they may never have taken part in the proceedings.
Equally the steps required to give notice are crucial for if they are too onerous
they may make the case impractical to run. Most class action procedures are
differentiated from representative actions by being opt-out in nature. The
United Kingdom GLO is different in this respect for it only covers claims that
have been entered on to the group register i.e. it is an opt-in scheme.
Under most schemes the judge is given wide discretion as to the
appropriate form of notice. Ontario has the innovative feature that notification
costs can be funded through the Class Proceedings Fund (see below). For a
personal injury claim, the preference for a representative action style opt-in
procedure or a class action opt-out procedure is finely balanced. Given the
amounts at stake it may be thought unfair to place the conduct of someone's
claim in the hands of a third party without their express permission. By
contrast, where small claims are involved individuals are likely to suffer little
by having the action taken on their behalf and indeed the only likely alternative
is that the case does not get litigated at all. As the point of principle is decided
by an independent arbiter, the consumer can only win by the proper
development of the law and any possible compensation going either to him
directly or cy-presed to activities that benefit him indirectly as a consumer.
Funding for class actions in the United States is uncomplicated. Lawyers
work on contingent fees and there is usually no liability for the other party's
costs, even if the case is lost. That is not to say that the level of such fees
should not be a proper topic for debate, taking as they do usually one third of
the damages. We have already noted the criticism that in many consumer class
actions only the lawyers gain much financially. In most countries funding is
more problematic. Indeed, funding is the most problematic aspect of collective
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litigation. 1 6 Although class actions are normally more cost effective than
individual actions, they can still be expensive to run. There is a general drift
towards contingent fees, although a reluctance to replicate completely the
United States' system. In the United Kingdom for instance, successful lawyers
can obtain an uplift of up to 100 percent of their normal fee and in Ontario there
is a non-percentage contingent fee based on the lawyer's hourly rate, number of
hours worked and a multiplier.
The more serious problem however is to deal with the liability to the other
party for their costs if the case is unsuccessful in full or in part. In the
Australian Federal and Ontario procedure the representative is personally liable
(although he may have an agreement with those he represents regarding cost
sharing), whereas the United Kingdom approach is for the costs to be borne by
all parties represented. This rule was problematic when confirmed by the
courts. 17 It disturbed the practice of selecting legally aided plaintiffs against
whom costs were not awarded as representatives in test cases.
The idea of waiving the loser pays rule fees is appropriate in class actions.
This is especially so as far as low value consumer claims are concerned, for one
can readily understand why few individuals would find it beneficial to risk costs
liability for small individual personal gain.
Ontario has adopted a novel approach to address this issue. Not only is the
representative not to be liable in test cases where a novel point of law is raised
or where a matter of public interest was involved; but also where a plaintiff has
received assistance from the Class Proceedings Fund then the Fund will be
liable rather than the representative. For this reason, funding from the Fund can
be crucial despite the fact that it only covers disbursements and not lawyer's
fees." 8 In Quebec, a government agency (the Fonds) provides assistance for
both disbursements and lawyer's fees, and the problem of the other sides' costs
is now covered by a rule that the claim is treated as one for a modest amount for
which only moderate costs are recoverable.
In Hong Kong, a loan from the state lottery was used to establish a scheme
which meets the legal expenses of litigants in return for a percentage of
damages. It seems clear that if class actions are to work, at least outside the
realm of personal injury litigation, then novel forms of funding and liability for
costs need to be addressed. This is another example of how consumer litigation
challenges the legal system to find novel solutions.
116. Klaus Viitanen, The Crisis of the Welfare State, Privitisation and Consumers' Access to Justice,
in FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STRTE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVITIZATION AND PRIVATE LAW (1999).
117. Allocating Liabilities in Opren action, Davies v. Eli Lilly and Co., TIMES (London), May 11,
1987.
118. Ontario Law Commission: Report on Class Actions (1982) (explaining that the commission had
proposed that the loser pays rule not apply in class actions)
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Where class actions are simply used as an efficient means for processing
individual claims then individual assessment of damages may be appropriate.
However, even in personal injury cases there are examples of class actions
giving rise to novel solutions which better reflect the collective dimension of the
problem. The provision in the Agent Orange settlement providing for part of
the damages to be used to improve Veteran healthcare is one example. In small-
scale consumer claims, it may sometimes be possible to award individualized
compensation. For instance, if a utility charges an unlawful amount it could be
ordered to reimburse that amount to all its customers. It may be more difficult
to see how a taxi company that overcharged its customers could trace them to
effect repayment. However, this novel problem was overcome in the New York
class action case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., " 9 where the cab drivers were
ordered to undercharge for a period so that the unlawful profits were returned
to the customers. Of course this was rough and ready in the sense that not all
customers would be compensated to the same degree, depending on their cab
hiring habits during the two periods, but unjust enrichment was avoided and
some form of compensation received by those who used New York cabs
regularly. Any more exact distribution of damages would have been
impractical. Most class action procedures make provision for the award of
aggregate damages so long as some sound basis for that assessment can be
discerned. The United Kingdom is out of line in this respect, but even here
settlements can have cy-pres characteristics. For instance, Rover paid £lM for
car research to the Consumers' Association to compensate for breach of
competition laws.' 2° Once again consumer disputes require reconsideration of
existing principles.
The payment of damages to consumer associations in appropriate cases
might be a way forward for overcoming the problem of providing incentives for
them to bring small consumer claims. As Olsen well demonstrates, there is
every reason why individuals will not follow Ihering' s call to invoke the law in
the general interest.' 21 The United States' solution is to provide this incentive
to private lawyers through the lure of attractive fees. In China, the peasant
Wang Hai is using the laws on exemplary damage for counterfeiting as the basis
for a nice income generation scheme based on uncovering counterfeit goods.1
22
However, in many cultures there seem something distasteful about leaving
recovery to such private enterprise initiatives. This is not to say that the role of
individual litigation in developing good standards should be underestimated.
119. See 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. 1967).
120. David Nicholson-Lord, Rover 'Pays' Im Pounds Compensation, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 17, 1993, at 2.
121. M. OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, (1965).
122. M. lp, "An Update on the 'Wang Hai' Phenomenon" (2000) 8 Consumer Law Journal 71.
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Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether the energies put into obtaining
standing and lobbying for new procedures by consumer organizations might not
be more effectively spent in litigating test cases. However, such a strategy
requires resources, often from the public purse, which are increasingly scarce.
XVIII. LEGAL AID
Public funding of lawyers is on the retreat. The one time fairly extensive
United Kingdom legal aid system is now in decline with lawyers being looked
to take cases on a conditional fee basis under which they can claim a success fee
of up to 100 percent if they win depending upon the risk involved. To some
extent, we do not regret some aspects of the decline of Cappellti's first
economic wave for in many respects lawyers rather than litigants or society
seemed to be the main beneficiaries of legal aid. One of the main stimulants for
reform in the United Kingdom was the benzodiazepine cases where £33 M of
public money was spent on a product liability action that never got to court.
However, there is a tendency to throw the baby out with the bath water, and
public funding needs to be more available than it is for high-risk cases that are
unsuitable for conditional fees. Also, there is a need for a more developed
system of legal advice to consumers than exists in most countries.
One interesting model is the New South Wales Legal Aid Commission,
which although with a far smaller budget that their counterparts in the United
Kingdom, seems to have achieved some notable successes by retaining in house
lawyers to work on cases in areas prioritized by the Commission." 3 This shows
that Capelletti' s economic wave still has some life left in it although the funding
of consumer litigation from the public purse may need to be rethought.
Indeed it is noticeable that in Australia there is a lot of case law (at least in
contrast to the United Kingdom) on consumer credit. This seems to be due to
the activity of specialist law centers for financial service funded out of cy-pres
type settlements where creditors have failed to comply with disclosure
requirements and, as a result, agreed to pay money into a financial counseling
trust fund. This is interesting and could be the possible basis for a holy cycle,
whereby such cy-pres arrangements provide an incentive for consumer
organizations to bring actions to protect the consumer interest and then use the
profits to bring further actions and thereby effectively police the market at the
expense of the market.
XIX. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
One alternative to private initiative class actions is the use of public
authorities. The faith in public authorities to regulate the market place varies
123. Ben Slade, Not Enough Lawyers, 36 LAW &SOC'Y J. 58 (1998).
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from culture to culture. It is probably at its highest in Scandinavia where the
Consumer Ombudsmen play an important role, and at its lowest in the United
States where citizens distrust the power of Government to control powerful
business interests, 124 and in developing countries where resources are too scarce
to permit effective enforcement. However, public authorities are likely to place
less emphasis on providing individuals with compensation than with efforts to
protect the general public interest. It is true that in some countries criminal
prosecutions can be an important means of providing consumers with the means
to compensation. For instance, in France the action civile allows the criminal
courts to award compensation to those injured by the breach of the law. Similar
rules allowed the victims of the Colza cooking oil affair in Spain to recover. In
other countries, especially in S. America, the Attorney Generals help consumers
recover damages as well as police the criminal laws. The United Kingdom
courts do have powers to award compensation in such situations under s. 35 of
the Power of Criminal Courts Act 1973, but these powers are rarely utilized to
their full extent and more generally public authorities do not see it as their
function to expend resources in providing compensation.
The Australian Consumer and Competition Commission has a novel power
to intervene in assisting product liability victims. This has been little used as
private practice lawyers are quick to take up the most likely cases and there is
no provision for similar powers where they are most needed, in claims of
modest value.
XX. PUBLIC INTEREST COLLECTIVE LITIGATION
As public bodies become involved in the litigation of claims on behalf of
individuals, we see that the line between public and private interest litigation is
not distinct. We will however now turn our attention to ways in which such
bodies act with the predominant purpose of improving consumer welfare
generally, rather than recovering damages for consumers.
XXI. CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS
Particularly in France and Germany, consumer organizations have a
tradition of using litigation to promote the consumer interest. However,
especially in Germany consumer organizations (Verbrauceher Zentrale125 in
each Land and a central Verbraucher Schutz Verein) should not be viewed in the
same light as the organic grassroots organizations that exist in most of the
common law world. They are part of the corporatist state structure being funded
124. Even there, there is some good work being done by bodies such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the State Attorney Generals.
125. Not all are equally active in using their powers.
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by the state and perform an important structural role in market surveillance. In
Germany the consumer organizations main. powers have traditionally been to
challenge unfair trade practices under the Law Against Unfair Competition
1965, and in more recent times unfair contract terms under the Law on Standard
Contract Terms 1976, as amended. The consumer organizations typically
negotiate with traders and obtain their agreement to desist in the practice or
failing that seek injunctions. If these are breached, fines are payable but these
go to the court. It has from time to time been proposed that consumer groups
be allowed to recover damages, but this has not come to fruition.
126
In France, the consumer organizations have also had this market
surveillance role, but whilst some powers merely provide for injunctive relief
(for example in 1988 they were given the power to challenge unfair terms)'27 the
majority also permit consumer organizations to become involved in claims for
damages. French consumer organizations were first given the right to bring
actions in the collective interest by art. 46 of the Royer Law of 27 December
1973. 128 A decision of the Court de Cassation in 1985 made it clear that this
only applied where there was an action civile in the strict sense i.e. there must
have been a breach of the criminal law. The offence must have harmed, directly
or indirectly, the collective interest of consumers. This is an interesting
principle for the consumer organizations are seen as representing the collective
consumer interest. This has been described by Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz as
being half-way between the individual interest of consumers and the general
interest of citizens. The former can be protected by the individuals
themselves, the latter by the minist~re public. By contrast consumer groups are
best placed to protect the collective consumer interest. Consumer groups can
seek injunctions, damages or publicity for the judgment at the defendant's
expense.
XXII. DAMAGES FOR COLLECTIVE HARM
The nature of damages for harm to the collective interest are difficult to
discern with certainty. Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz suggests it is to compensate
the consumer organizations for their efforts. However, they also comment that
they might be viewed as private fines and this fits best with the belief they form
part of a deterrence strategy. 3 ° They note that often the judges fail to confront
the issue and only award a symbolic franc. However the consumer
126. R. Tur, Litigation and the Consumer Interest: The Class Action and Beyond, 2 LEGAL STUD.
135, 165-166 (1982).
127. See C. CON. art. 421-6 (Fr.)
128. Id. (now the Consumer Code).
129. J. CALAIS-AULOY & F. STEINMETZ, DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION, (1996).
130. S. CARVAL, LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE DANS SA FONCTION DE PEINE PRIVEE, (1995).
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organization, Que Choisir in their booklet, 20 ans d'action civile, cite a decision
of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 11 December 1995 which states that there
should be full compensation and not merely a symbolic amount. How should
this be calculated? One approach might be for it to cover damages that cannot
be compensated to individuals for practical/logistical reasons. A more
satisfying theoretical justification might be one based on the harm to consumer
confidence in the market caused by misleading advertising or the sale of
dangerous products. Thus, whilst France has introduced the interesting concept
of damage to the collective consumer interest as something distinct from the
accumulation of individual claims, the implications of this new principle have
yet to be worked out. This goes beyond our view of the collective interest being
to recover damages that otherwise would not have been recovered by individual
proceedings. It is an interesting concept which can perhaps be invoked when
the amount of individual damages is difficult to assess. It might be possible to
argue that poor business practices actually cause more than the sum of
individual losses because of the impact on market confidence in general. Thus,
harm for the collective interest is closely linked to a fine. Payment to a
consumer organization, in addition to individual losses, may provide the
incentive for consumer organizations to bring such cases, but we suspect there
will be strong resistance to such an approach where full compensation is also
awarded. It is more likely that awards to consumer organizations will be more
easily accepted if they are viewed as part of the compensatory package.
XXI. CONSUMER GROUPS AND INDIVIDUAL LITIGATION
Consumer groups in France can also become a party to individual
litigation, 3' but this power is severely limited and adds little to the consumer's
groups power simply to assist consumers. As actual harm is required, it cannot
be used as a mechanism to prevent harm occurring in the first place. Such
instances show how blurred the distinction between public and private interest
collective litigation can be.
The French Consumer Law Reform Commission had proposed a class
action procedure based on the N. American model, but having the French
characteristic that the action would have been brought by a consumer
organization. 132 The organization would have been able to bring an action on
the question of liability in principle without even informing the consumers they
claimed to represent. Once the decision was handed down publicity would be
given to it, and consumers could decide whether to benefit from the decision or
take their own action. In fact, the French legislator adopted a half-way house
131. C. CON. art. 421-7 (Fr.)
132. COMMISSION DE REFONTE: PROPOSITION POUR UN CODE DE LA CONSUMMATION, (1990)
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in its Neietz law of 18 January 1992, which was supplemented by a decree of
11 December 1992.' The right of action arises where several identified
individual consumers suffer harm from the same cause as the result of the act
of the same trader. Thus, it provides a mechanism for them to represent the sum
of individual interests, rather than simply the collective interest which is
protected by the action civile. It is broader than the action civile in that it can
concern both an action civile or a civil law claim. This procedure is unlikely to
have a great impact. In part this is because of the need to identify victims and
have them mandate the organization to represent them. This is hampered by the
restriction that only the written press may be used, for fear that using audio-
visual media might unfairly tarnish a company's image before it has been found
to have done wrong. More fundamentally, one might question why a consumer
organization would wish to involve itself in such a procedure. It can in any
event assist consumers to bring actions and this new procedure does not entitle
it to claim damages in its own right. Under this procedure consumer
organizations simply expose themselves to liabilities in terms of claims by
consumers if they do not exercise their mandate properly and by producers if
they damage their reputations unfairly. They may also be held liable for the
producers' costs if the action fails.
XXIV. INJUNCTIONS
The notion of collective injunction actions has clearly taken root in Europe
driven by EC law. Starting with the misleading advertisement directive, 134
successive consumer protection directives included provision for injunction
procedures. Drawing upon the diverse traditions within the Community these
provided standing to either public bodies whose task it was to protect consumers
or consumer organizations having the same function. Sometimes these were
clearly alternatives, 13 at other times it was arguable that the wording of the
directives required member states to give standing to consumer groups as well
as public authorities. This development culminated in a Consumer Injunctions
Directive, 136 to which we shall return when considering cross-border regulation.
Here it is clear member states have the choice of whether standing be granted
to public authorities or consumer organizations or both.'37 Granting it to both
is becoming the standard preference of legislators, although actual practice
remains linked to national traditions. The Directive's policy is aimed at the
133. See C. CON. art. 422 (Fr.)
134. Council Directive 84/450, 1984 O.J. (L 250) 17-20.
135. As in misleading advertising directive.
136. Council Directive 98/27, art. 3, 1998 0. (L 166) 51, 52.
137. Id.
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protection of the collective interests of consumers. 138 Its policy is not complete
as it does not cover all areas of consumer law - safety laws are one notable
omission - and of course it only provides for injunctive relief not damages.
The impact of this new European policy on the United Kingdom is
interesting. The United Kingdom has little history of consumer organizations
having standing to enforce consumer laws and indeed the Control of Misleading
Advertisement Regulations (implementing the EC Directive) only gave such
power to the Director General of Fair Trading.' 39 The first implementation of
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations similarly restricted
standing to the Director General. However the Consumers Association
challenged this in the European courts and the incoming Labour Government
agreed to settle the case by granting standing to the Consumers' Association and
a host of other bodies. 4° A similar approach has been adopted when
implementing of the Consumer Injunctions Directive.' 4' It is not yet clear
whether this represents a change of culture. One suspects that so long as the
public authorities make a good fist of market surveillance, the private consumer
organizations will be happy not to invest their resources in court battles.
Indeed, the notion of representative action was taken to heart by the Labour
Government who set up a committee to look into how such a procedure should
work not only in the consumer context, but also in any setting where a collective
interest was at stake. Whilst the notion of representative actions for injunctions
and declaratory relief were accepted in principle,142 there is more hesitation over
including damage claims, although interesting this possibility was not excluded
in the final report. 14 However, if consumer organizations are to participate in
market surveillance, they need some encouragement, possibly in the form of
allowing the cy-presing at least part of the damages or allowing the recovery of
legal fees. Under the current situation all they have is the threat of costs liability
against them.
XXV. SOCIAL ACTION LITIGATION
Before concluding this survey of collective redress mechanism, it is worth
mentioning the Indian experience of Social Action Litigation.'14 This provides
138. Id. at art. I.
139. The Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations, No. 915 (1988) (Eng.).
140. See now, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, No. 2083 (1999) (Eng.).
141. DTI Consultation paper, Injunctions Directive Implementation of Directive 98/27 EC on
Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' interests, 19 (2000).
142. Although there remain some problems about bringing such actions before a private law right
of action has accrued if damage is an element of the cause of action.
143. See LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPT., REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS: PROPOSED NEW PROCEDURES
(2001).
144. D. Harland, Collective Access to Justice-Some Perspectives from Asia and the Pacific, 90
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that where a person or class of person is unable to approach the Supreme Court
by virtue of poverty, disability or their socially or economically disadvantaged
position then any member of the public or a social action group acting bona fide
can.apply seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused. The
Court has been willing to act on a simple letter directed to the court and in some
cases has taken over the proceedings, for example establishing a socio-legal
commission to investigate the complaint. Although primarily aimed at instances
of state repression and exploitation of disadvantaged groups, it has been used
to further consumer concerns. Doubtless this model is the product of the
particular socio-economic conditions prevailing in India, but it nevertheless
serves to remind us of the need to give voice to the collective concerns of
groups which might be ordinarily excluded form the legal process, including
consumers.
XXVI. SUMMARY
Leaving to one side the special experience of India, we have a bleak picture
of how consumers are protected as a collective so far as compensation
procedures are concerned. Only in France and to some extent at the EC level
by virtue of the Injunctions Directive, is the notion of collective interest
recognized as a distinct legal category, but it is only in France and even their
hesitantly that there is seen as a need to compensate for harm caused to the
collective. It might be argued that the consumer class actions in the United
States represent an attempt to provide compensation for small but widely
dispersed losses that affect the consumer collective. The problem there is that
the incentives to lawyers tend not to require them to extract the best
compensation for consumers. Elsewhere the position with regard to public
bodies and consumer organizations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
seems better, but the United States class action model where copied has almost
exclusively been used for high ticket value cases and not for the mass, small,
widely disbursed consumer claims. Indeed some systems seem to turn their face
against such a use of the class action procedure: the Australian federal
procedure contains a power to stop proceedings where the cost of distributing
money would be excessive as the class is too large and individual amounts
claimed are small. 45
One argument might be that there is not the same need for the regulatory
role performed by private lawyers in United States class action cases in other
Western countries, as in Europe and other common law countries, this function
is performed by regulators and consumer groups. However, evidently there is
a unmet need in these countries to deliver justice to consumers who have
CHULALNMGKORN L. REV. 126, 134-36 (1990).
145. S. 33M. Federal Court Of Australia Act 1976.
2002]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
suffered small losses and to prevent traders being unjustly enriched. If this
cannot be achieved directly by compensating consumers then attempts can be
made to achieve this indirectly by cy-pres orders giving damages to bodies
promoting the consumer interest.
However, it is undeniable that collective actions to protect the consumer
interest is a dynamic area of law which one can expect to see develop in the
future both as regards injunctive and declaratory relief and representative and
class actions. However, we have already commented that a lot of consumer
litigation takes place in the lowest level courts and in alternative dispute
resolution forums. It is arguable that many class actions for small individual
amounts are in reality large claims and do not belong in the small claims courts.
However, such claims may have to be litigated there and indeed one could
imagine localized problems affecting the residents of a particular area being best
sorted out by the local small claims court. Yet some class action schemes, such
as Ontario's, exclude small claims courts. This may be because there is a
feeling that small claims courts cannot handle the complexity of a class action.
By contrast, many ADR schemes are sophisticated enough to handle collective
disputes, and some indeed actually do accept some collective disputes. Some
individual complaints become, in effect, test cases where a decision in one case
is enforced at least on behalf of all others who bring a complaint on the same
terms, although not necessarily with respect to those consumers who have
suffered but have not contacted the ADR institution. "' These examples should
be followed and publicized so that the waves for organizational and procedural
reform Cappellti detected, converge rather that flow in separate directions. This
is the sixth wave of integration that we want to see developed.
XXVII. GLOBALIZATION
Our fifth wave in consumer litigation: the globalization of consumer
disputes, is perhaps the most talked about new wave in consumer access to
justice. One might suspect sometimes that it is a phenomenon that is more
talked about than real. For instance, a Eurobarometer survey found that only
2% of European consumers had a complaint about goods purchased overseas. '47
Given the internal market in Europe, one might expect this figure to be even less
elsewhere in the globe. Of this 2%, 43% complained in person or by telephone
to the seller, 36% did not react and only 6% consulted a lawyer. Interestingly,
146. Guy Dennis, Borrowers In Line for Mortgage Payout, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 26, 2001.
(showing a recent example in the UK concerning a decision by the Banking Omubudsman against lenders who
gave new customers a better deal on mortgage rates than existing customers, and that complaints have been
upheld against several banks and building societies who adopted this practice, and the implication is that
significant compensation will have to be paid to a large number of borrowers).
147. Les Europeens et l'acces A lajustice- Resultats significatifs de l'Eurobarometre 52.1.
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the most popular choice for European consumers as a means of resolving
disputes purchased abroad was a public consumer body. As we shall see this
option is not on the Community's agenda.
Although still small in numbers, it is reasonable to predict that cross border
consumer complaints will grow in significance. There are several factors giving
rise to the globalization of consumer disputes. As the inexorable rise (at least
before 11 September) in air traffic indicates the world's population is simply
becoming more mobile. It is to be expected that consumers will not leave their
passion for shopping at home and indeed will take advantage of local bargains
and differential pricing. This phenomenon is being encouraged by regional free
trade zones which not only remove taxation barriers, but (at least in the case of
the EC) positively encourage the consumer to act as an active competitive
dynamic within the internal market though the adoption of minimum consumer
protection rules throughout the Community.
Obviously the development of e-commerce is going to be a major factor
in the globalization of consumer disputes. Another dimension of the internet is
that it has the ability to take the consumer away from even its regional bloc and
allow him to contract anywhere in the globe and frequently in N. America!
The globalization of disputes also keys into many of the other waves we
have identified. Most obvious is the link with procedural changes, for the
distance between consumer and trader in global disputes makes the traditional
courts even more impracticable as a forum and inevitably gives succor to the
procedural wave and the trend towards ADR. However, it also gives impetus
to the organizational wave, for as individuals become less able to resolve
disputes across borders, so there is more need for collective solutions. Equally
one might argue that new economic solutions need to be adopted as individuals
who can afford to litigate at home, or can use self-help solutions within their
own jurisdictions, are more vulnerable when faced with the additional cost and
complexity of suing across borders. However, one sees little sign of there being
a lot of money to assist consumers resolve cross border disputes. We will also
suggest that if global mechanisms can be set up to assist consumers then this
might indeed help enhance the regulatory role of consumer litigation, which we
argue should be seen as an important element in modern redress regimes.
Amongst the consequences of this will be the ability of global regulators to
identify more easily bad practices in particular states and bring trading standards
up to international norms.
XXVIII. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
There have certainly been some attempts to make the traditional court
based remedies responsive to consumer needs. This is evidenced by the rules
of private international law. Within Europe, the 1968 Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
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Matters'48 contained special consumer protection rules ensuring that in certain
circumstances consumers could sue in their domestic courts and also only be
sued there.' 49 Similarly, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations 1980 provides for circumstances in which consumers
cannot be deprived of the mandatory rules of their state. 50  These rules are
currently being updated with the intention of making them part of EC law rather
than merely Conventions that member states sign up to. This process has
already been completed for jurisdictional issues and negotiations on choice of
law matters are in progress.
The EC Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters' 5' was adopted with
an eye on the development of Internet shopping. Its provisions give consumers
access to their domestic courts where:
the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the
consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that
Member State or to several States including that Member State, and
the contract falls within the scope of such activities.
There is a certain ambiguity as to whether the provision covers sales made
on both passive and interactive web-sites, but the general view is that this is a
consumer friendly provision, as it seems to give consumers purchasing over the
net the right to sue in their home jurisdiction. However, the reality is that few
consumers will make use of it, because there are numerous practical obstacles
which militate against consumers suing parties across borders.' 52 Also, it has
been calculated that the average cost of suing across borders in the EU for a
2000 Ecu claim is 2500 Ecu, and the proceedings will take between 12 and 64
months depending on the country. 153 Allowing the consumer to sue in his own
148. See generally 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Jan. 1, 1998, 27 I.L.M. I.
149. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Jan. 1, 1998, art. 13-15, 27 I.L.M. 1.
150. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature June 19,
1980, 266 Europ. T.S. No. 1.
151. Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1.
152. See generally Report by the European Consumer Law Group, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
in Cross-Border Consumer Complaints- Socio-legal Remarks on an Ongoing Dilemma Concerning Effective
Legal Protection for Consumer-Citizens in the European Union, E.C.L.G. 157/98 (1998), available at:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/eclg/rep0len.html (last visited October 12, 2002).
153. See Commission Communication to the Parliament, Council, Economic and Social Committee
and Committee of the Regions Concerning the Action Plan on Consumer Access to Justice and the Settlement
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courts alleviates the problem, but there remain significant practical problems for
consumers when suing a party in another state.
There is another problem that the European rules on jurisdiction face as
regards regulating the Internet and that is that they do not extend beyond
Europe. In particular, they do not cover companies based in the United States.
There are attempts to renegotiate the Hague Convention to deal with this issue,
but these negotiations look like being prolonged and when agreement is finally
reached it will be necessary for states to ratify the Convention. Indeed action
to deal with the consumer problems associated with globalization is most
evident within Europe, because the EC has both the need for such rules to
promote its internal market and the political mechanisms to address the issue.
One might hope that a body such as the OECD would take the lead in expanding
these rules beyond the member states of the EC. However, despite some efforts
at promoting guidelines for consumer protection and e-commerce, which raises
issues of dispute resolution and redress, this has not taken concrete form to-date.
Indeed in the field of product safety one sees the opposite phenomenon. The
OECD's notification system on consumer safety matters has suffered from the
development of binding notification procedures at the EC level.
XXIX. EUROPEAN INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE CROSS-BORDER
CONSUMER REDRESS
Although access to justice issues have long been mentioned in consumer
policy debates at the EC level the main impetus has been since the 1993 Green
Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer
Disputes in the Single Market. 54 We have already noted that it adopted a
Resolution on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of court
settlements of consumer disputes.'55 It has recently followed this up with a
Recommendation on the principles for out of court bodies involved in the
consensual resolution of consumer disputes. 56 Whilst the former covers third
parties who propose or impose solutions, the latter deals with third parties who
seek to find an agreement by common consent. Neither therefore covers
company internal procedures. The intention is to give consumers confidence
that these bodies are truly impartial, transparent, effective and fair. The
guidelines by and large reflect good practice. Our main concern, as regards the
of Consumer Disputes in the Internal Market, COM(96) 13 at 9.
154. Green Paper- Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the
Single Market, COM(93)576 final.
155. Commission Recommendation on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-
of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 1998 O.J. (L 115) 31.
156. Commission Recommendation on the Principles for Out-of-Court Bodies Involved in the
Consentual Resolution of Consumer Disputes, 2001 O.J. (L 109) 56.
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impact of globalization is whether the obligation to comply with the Rome
Convention requirement that in some circumstances the mandatory rules of the
consumer's state should apply might not be too onerous for many ADR schemes
that lack adequate legal resources.
At the same time as the 1998 Recommendation was issued, a consumer
complaints form was produced. Interestingly, this had originally been intended
as a means of making it easier for EC consumers to use the courts of other
member states. This had to be abandoned as "[e]valuation [has shown] that use
of the form as a legal instrument for simplifying seizure of the national courts
is incompatible with the heterogeneity and rigidity of the procedural rules of the
individual legal orders."' 57 This is evidence that globalization of disputes will
lead to increased use of ADR because of the inability of the traditional courts
to adapt. Although interestingly Ireland has mooted the possibility of its small
claims court system being available on-line,'58 there has generally been little
movement in traditional courts to respond to the globalized nature of consumer
disputes, despite the United Kingdom devoting a conference to this topic when
it held the presidency of the EC in June 1998.
The complaints form guides the consumer to explain the nature of her
problem and the remedy sought through a series of multiple choice and free text
boxes. As the form is available in all the official languages, the use of multiple
choice clearly circumvents some of the language problems, but does not remove
them entirely as there is still some textual content required. The form is
intended in the first instance for use in negotiations between consumer and
trader, and if that fails, for facilitating the use of ADR procedures. Consumers
may turn to consumer organizations to assist them, but such bodies are aware
of their lack of expertise and the European Advisors Forum has sought to
develop a protocol on how cross border disputes should be handled. 59 To assist
consumers with disputes the Commission has set up thirteen European
Consumer Advice Centres. These have expertise in advising consumers about
cross-border consumer problems. However, these resources are obviously
thinly spread and another example of the wane of the first wave of providing
economic assistance to ensure consumers have legal redress. Mitchell has made
envious comparisons with the Action for Single Market schemes which are
located within ministries and therefore receive government backing. They
investigate queries and complaints from business and can take up the matter
157. Towards Greater Efficiency in Obtaining and Enforcing Judgments in the EU, COM(97)609 at
14.
158. Comm. on Consumer Policy Report, Government and Private Sector Initiatives to Promote and
Implement the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, DSTI/CP
(2000) 7 final at 9.




with the Commission or member states concerned, whereas the consumer
centers merely offer advice. 1
60
The Commission has created a European Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-
NET), comprised of notified bodies which comply with its guidelines for ADR
bodies and national clearing houses.' 6' A similar scheme (FIN-NET) is already
up and running for financial services. Under EEJ-NET, the national clearing
houses will be both a national contact point providing domestic consumers with
information on ADR bodies in their jurisdiction, and also enabling European
consumers to access ADR schemes in other countries by contacts with the
clearing house in the supplier's state. It will also provide the consumer with
assistance in formatting and filing his complaint, although it is unclear to what
extent this covers assistance with translation costs.
In addition to its role as an information source and facilitator, it is also
foreseen that the clearing houses will provide support for policy makers through
its strategic role in monitoring and storing information about the level and
nature of complaints. This is a good example of how the regulatory function of
consumer litigation is being recognized.
The Commission has appreciated the need to enhance consumer access to
justice, but the barriers to this are immense. Frequently, for instance, it
comments upon the impossibility of interfering with national judicial
procedures. Yet it is bravely trying to promote the cause of consumer access to
justice. In its recent discussion document, Ideas for a Consumer Policy
Strategy, 6 2 it talks about the need to ensure access to justice for consumers
"both individual (agreement on applicable law for contractual and non-
contractual disputes, building on the approach for jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments, alternative dispute resolutions and small claims courts) and
collectively (examining the potential of a mechanism for collective redress of
consumers at EU level).' 63
XXX. INTERNET
Similar hopes concerning regulatory objectives are also being expressed
for the global online dispute resolution (ODR rather than ADR!) bodies in the
field of e-commerce. For instance, the American Bar Association's Task Force
on E-Commerce and Dispute Resolution has suggested that as part of adhering
to an ODR Trustmark scheme there should be an obligation on the online
160. Id. at 102.
161. Commission Working Document on the Creation of a European Extra-Judicial Network
(EEJNET)
162. See Ideas for a Consumer Policy Strategy, http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/
intro02-en.pdf (last visited October 12, 2002).
163. id.
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dispute resolution provider and/or trustmark entity to notify the public
authorities that have jurisdiction over the business activities of the particular
merchant. 164 A lot could be said about the moves to create online dispute
resolution schemes. It is clearly based on self-regulatory structures and a
recognition that traditional court structures cannot deal with low value cross
border disputes. However, equally there is also a recognition that consumers
need to have confidence in these schemes and a range of private and public
accreditation scheme are developing. The problem is to develop principles
which offer a globally recognized standard for a global medium. There are
some national standards, such as Trust UK, but these need to be part of an
international framework. Unfortunately, as the issue becomes globalized so it
becomes more difficult to agree standards and to ensure consumers have
confidence in those standards. Much more could be said on this topic, but for
present purposes it suffices to say that it is a clear example of the globalizing
trend in consumer litigation and also clear evidence that this will lead to
increased use of ADR.
XXXI. MAKING TRADERS ACCOUNTABLE ACROSS BORDERS
Of course as companies trade more and more across borders, there is a
problem of how to hold them accountable for compliance with consumer
protection laws. Indeed, the variety of consumer laws can be a headache even
for a firm seeking to trade ethically. Failing harmonization, one way around
this is for country of origin controls and systems of mutual recognition. These
are indeed hallmarks of EC internal market law. However, regulators still find
it harder to enforce laws in the global environment. There are some initiatives
such as the 24/7 initiative by the Attorney Generals in the United States to
ensure there is always someone available in every state to respond to urgent
internet problems. There are also examples of consumer agencies around the
world setting particular days aside to collaborate on seeking out Internet scams.
However, such efforts appear to involve running to stand still against the welter
of problems thrown up by the increased globalization of trade.
Once again the EC has developed a novel solution. It was apparent that
there was a need to develop strategies to prevent companies from taking
advantage of the fact that the internal market had not been matched by the
development of an internal legal order. This was obvious when French
companies targeted German consumers with misleading advertising. The
German consumer organizations had no standing before the French courts and
164. Draft Preliminary Report & Concept Paper, 2001 A.B.A. ASS'N TASK FORCE ON E-COMMERCE
& ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL.
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the French authorities had no interest (in some countries the problem would be
a lack of authority) to protect German consumers. 165
As previously described the Community had developed the notion of
collective injunctions in several consumer law directives. This policy
culminated in Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of
consumers' interests, 166 which gave it an internal market dimension. This
Directive requires member states to notify bodies who can bring injunction
actions to prevent the infringement of the laws implementing a list of directives
found in its annex where this would harm the collective interest of consumers. 167
Although the Directive clearly offers the choice of these bodies being either
independent public bodies or consumer organizations, or both,168 in practice
both sorts of body are given standing. Not only do these bodies have standing
in domestic matters, 169 but they can also seek injunctions in other member states
where the interests they protect are affected. Thus, a German consumer
organization can seek an injunction before the French courts for misleading
advertising aimed at German consumers, but emanating from France. Member
states can introduce a requirement that the entity first consult with the defendant
and/or a qualified entity within the state where the injunction is sought. This is
again an instance of a regional rather than a global solution. It is of limited
assistance when one of the parties is outside that region. Again, one approach
may be to try to develop international agreements or bilateral agreements to take
these principles further, but one may doubt how fast developments of this nature
can take place. Nevertheless, this example serves to show how organizational
changes in consumer litigation (in the form of collective injunctions) are made
even more necessary because of the trend to globalization.
XXXII. CONCLUSIONS
Globalization enhances several of the trends that were becoming apparent
in consumer litigation and concerns to address this phenomenon will underpin
our thinking in the future. At the same time there is a need to remember most
consumer disputes are still for small amounts and concern products and services
purchased locally. Currently, there are few realistic avenues for redress for such
claims. The only practical way of improving redress is through development of
the organizational and procedural reform waves identified by Capelletti. These
165. Hans-W. Micklitz, Cross-Border Consumer Conflicts- A French-German Experience, 16 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 411 (1993).
166. Council Directive 98/27, art. 2-3, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
167. Guidance has been provided on what amounts to collective interest, but this term remains
undefined in the legislation.
168. Council Directive 98/27, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
169. Council Directive 98/27, art. 2, 1998 O. (L 166) 51.
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will assist the local as well as the global consumer. Indeed, many local
problems are likely to be found replicated in other parts of the globe and so the
distinction should not be too strongly defined between the two types of
consumer problem. The economic reform wave has certainly faltered.
However, what is needed is new thinking on how limited public funds for
consumer advice can best be used. How can consumer advice centers best be
organized, how can litigation strategies be developed to best increase welfare?
Part of this may be to appreciate the regulatory impact of litigation in both the
court and ADR sectors. Above all, the legal system in the broadest sense must
be viewed as a whole. Innovative solutions developed in the traditional legal
system may have to be transplanted into the ADR sector if their benefits are to
be realized to the full. We have seen decades of experimentation and
innovation. This has also resulted in fragmentation in the procedures and
avenues for consumer redress. Our final call is for the cross-fertilization of
ideas and the integration of solutions. This has been an essay in comparative
law, but our call is for the lessons of comparisons not to stop at national borders,
but also for. the various consumer redress mechanisms within national legal
systems to learn from the experiences of one another.
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